

THE STUDENT WORLD

A quarterly magazine published at 13 Rue Calvin, Geneva
by the World's Student Christian Federation

Dr. W. A. VISSER 't HOOFT, *Editor*

VOLUME XXIII

January 1930

NUMBER 1

EDITORIALS

Who Challenges Whom?

The title of this number "The Challenge of Psychology to Christianity" was proposed by the Committee on Publications at the General Committee Meeting at Mysore. The phrase suggests that a new and successful science has come into being which asks searching questions of Christianity. It suggests also, that there is in these questions an element of attack on Christian thought. Consequently, one might have expected that the writers for this number would have stated these embarrassing questions, and would then have tried to give the answers from the Christian point of view as best they could.

Is it merely a curious coincidence that nearly all our contributors have taken a very different line? This number contains very little of a purely apologetic or defensive nature. It contains few indications of the sacrificing of essential elements of Christianity for the sake of agreement with psychology. It is much more concerned with the presentation of a challenge to psychology than with the meeting of a challenge from it. If we would try to express the common conviction underlying the majority of the articles we might say: Christianity contains fundamental truths which psychological research does not and cannot deny, and which it must recognise if it is to be worthy of the name which it bears. This is a most significant turn of the tide. May we take it

to mean that we have come to a new period in the relations between psychology and Christianity in which there will not only be no conflict between the two but in which Christianity will be considered as the source of the deepest knowledge about the human soul ?

It is not for us to answer this question. However impressive the agreement between men of so many different nations and interests — psychologists, biologists, philosophers, theologians — may be, we must not forget that the most obvious tendencies in the psychological world speak quite another language. Who shall say which answer represents the “newest” psychology? We have seen the label “New Psychology” on Freudianism, on Behaviourism and on Individual Psychology. There is no reason why the same honours should not be conferred on other modern psychologies like the one of Professor Spranger or the “Characterology” of Dr. Künkel. All of these are influential, all of these are modern. It is impossible to decide which is going to be the psychology of the future.

But if we do not know whether this Christian challenge to psychology is going to meet with success in the realm of science, we know at least that this approach makes it possible for us, who are laymen in this realm, to meet all psychology, new or old, with the confidence that we have not built our house on sand. Are there not many Christian students whose scientific and particularly whose psychological conscience is at perpetual war with their Christian convictions? And are we not all from time to time in danger of that type of defeatism which gives up the intellectual struggle and decides to create two water-tight compartments — one for Christianity and one for science? If we read and re-read what the writers of this number have to say to us, we may begin to see that we were unnecessarily afraid of truth. We may even come to the conclusion that there is a tremendously hopeful task before us, namely, to help in contributing to psychology what Christianity through the centuries has discovered about the soul of man.

This number makes no easy reading. It does not possess the attractiveness of many popular writings on psychology.

The reason is that the discussion about the relations of psychology and Christianity can only be pursued fruitfully if one deals with the underlying issues. If today it is easier to distinguish between the true and the false in psychology than it was twenty years ago, it is because we have come to a clearer view of the presuppositions of all science and of the science of psychic life especially. In order to understand we must be willing to dig deep. It is the price which has to be paid for all clear thinking. A World Student Christian Federation cannot pretend to help students to become Christian leaders unless it accepts the heavy task of intellectual formulation. Its members — the readers of the *Student World* — will help themselves and the Federation if they share in this task.

There is no other science which is so near to the life of all of us as is psychology. Wrong notions about psychology mean wrong notions about ourselves and our fellow men. Christians believe themselves to be concerned with reality. For them a psychological theory which denies the central tenets of the Christian faith is equivalent to a distortion of human life as it is. But that does not mean that we need to avoid psychology. On the contrary we must rejoice in its progress with the conviction that if it digs deep enough it must come to the discovery of the truth about man which Christianity finds in another way. In the present number we have some wonderful instances that this is already happening. The findings of Dr. Künkel — which are not based on a preconceived theory but on his experiences as a psychotherapist — are indications of what we mean. The "Christian" psychology to which Professor Brunner looks forward will be elaborated as psychology digs deeper and deeper into the life of men. It will not give us a scientific proof of the truth of Christianity. No science ever will. But it will make it more difficult for us to escape that truth about ourselves and about humanity of which Christianity speaks in its own way. In making us more conscious of the need for a greater, an eternal Reality it will be a truth which helps to "set us free".

V. 't H.

Traduction

Qui jette le Gant ?

Le titre de ce numéro, « Le défi de la psychologie au christianisme » a été proposé au Comité général de la Fédération à Mysore par le Comité des Publications. Cette phrase implique l'idée de l'apparition d'une science nouvelle et victorieuse qui à la pensée chrétienne pose des questions difficiles. Elle suggère aussi qu'il y a dans ces questions un élément agressif de la pensée chrétienne. En conséquence il semble que les auteurs des articles aient dû identifier ces questions et se soient efforcés de leur donner de leur mieux les réponses les plus adéquates, du point de vue chrétien.

Mais, est-ce une curieuse coïncidence, nos collaborateurs ont traité leur sujet sous un angle très différent ? On trouvera dans ce numéro fort peu de chose d'un caractère défensif ou de nature apologetique ; on y trouvera encore moins l'intention de sacrifier quelques-uns des éléments essentiels du christianisme pour arriver à un accord avec la psychologie. Dans l'ensemble, la préoccupation dominante est infiniment plus de défier la psychologie que de répondre au défi de celle-ci. Si nous cherchions à exprimer la conviction tacitement contenue dans la plupart des articles en question, nous pourrions dire : le christianisme contient des vérités fondamentales, que la psychologie ne peut pas nier et qu'elle doit reconnaître si elle est digne du nom qu'elle porte. Ceci marque un changement d'orientation très frappant. En concluons-nous que nous sommes arrivés à une nouvelle période des relations entre la psychologie et le christianisme, qui non seulement ne verra pas le conflit entre les deux, mais dans laquelle on considérera le christianisme comme la source la plus profonde de connaissance de l'âme humaine ?

Ce n'est pas à nous de répondre à cette question. Si émouvante que puisse être une entente complète entre hommes de tant de nations et d'intérêts divers — psychologues, philosophes, théologiens, biologistes — nous ne devons pas oublier que les tendances les plus marquantes du monde psychologique parlent un langage tout autre. Qui dira quelle est la réponse qui représente la « psychologie nouvelle » ? Nous avons vu l'étiquette « psychologie nouvelle » accolée au freudisme, au « behaviourism », à « l'Individualpsychologie » ? Il n'y a pas de raison que les mêmes honneurs ne soient accordés à d'autres psychologies modernes, comme celle du Professeur Spranger ou à la « caractérologie » du Dr. Künkel. Tous ces systèmes ont de

l'influence, tous sont modernes. Il est, par conséquent, impossible de décider quelle sera la psychologie de l'avenir.

Mais si nous ne savons pas si ce défi du christianisme à la psychologie aura quelque succès dans le domaine scientifique, nous savons tout au moins, que cette attitude nouvelle nous a donné la possibilité, à nous qui sommes des laïques dans ce domaine, d'affronter toute psychologie ancienne ou nouvelle avec la conviction que nous n'avons pas bâti notre maison sur le sable. N'y a-t-il pas beaucoup d'étudiants chrétiens dont la conscience scientifique et surtout psychologique est en guerre perpétuelle avec leurs convictions chrétiennes ? Et ne sommes-nous pas tous, de temps en temps, menacés de ce genre de défaitisme qui abandonne la lutte intellectuelle et décide de créer deux compartiments étanches, l'un pour le christianisme, l'autre pour la science ? Si nous lisons et relisons ce que les auteurs de ce numéro ont à nous dire, nous commençons à voir que nous avons peur sans nécessité de la vérité. Nous pouvons même envisager avec un grand espoir le devoir de contribuer à l'étude de la psychologie que le christianisme a découverte au cours des siècles dans l'âme humaine.

Ce numéro n'est pas d'une lecture facile. Il ne possède pas la puissance attractive de beaucoup d'écrits populaires sur la psychologie. La raison en est que la discussion, au sujet des relations de la psychologie et du christianisme, ne peut être poursuivie avec fruit que si l'on tient compte des questions fondamentales. S'il est plus facile aujourd'hui de distinguer entre le vrai et le faux en psychologie, que cela n'était il y a vingt ans, c'est parce que nous sommes parvenus à une vue plus nette des principes de toutes les sciences et de la science de la vie psychique en particulier. Pour pouvoir comprendre, il faut avoir la volonté de creuser profond. C'est le prix de toute pensée claire. Une fédération universelle d'étudiants chrétiens ne peut pas prétendre aider les étudiants à devenir des chefs de file chrétiens sans accepter la lourde tâche de formuler sa pensée. Ses membres, — les lecteurs du *Student World* — s'aideront et aideront la Fédération, s'ils prennent leur part de cette tâche.

Il n'y a pas d'autre science qui soit aussi près de notre vie à tous que la psychologie. De fausses notions sur la psychologie signifient notions fausses sur nous-mêmes et sur notre prochain. Pour les chrétiens, une théorie psychologique qui nie les doctrines fondamentales de la foi chrétienne équivaut à une fausse conception de la vie humaine telle qu'elle est en réalité. Mais cela ne signifie pas que nous ayons à nous garder de la psychologie. Au contraire, nous devons nous réjouir de ses progrès avec la conviction que, si elle creuse assez profond, elle aboutira à la découverte de la vérité sur l'homme à laquelle le

christianisme arrive par une autre route. Dans le présent numéro, nous avons quelques exemples merveilleux que cela se produit déjà. Les découvertes du Dr. Künkel, qui ne sont pas basées sur une théorie préconçue mais sur ses expériences de psycho-thérapie, sont des indications de ce que nous voulons dire. La psychologie chrétienne que demande le professeur Brunner sera une psychologie qui cherchera à pénétrer de plus en plus profond dans l'âme humaine. Cela ne nous donnera pas une preuve scientifique de la vérité du christianisme. Aucune science ne le pourra jamais. Mais il nous sera de plus en plus difficile d'échapper à la vérité sur nous-mêmes et sur l'humanité, exprimée par le christianisme à sa façon. En nous rendant plus conscients de la nécessité d'une réalité éternelle, cette vérité nous aidera à nous libérer.

Wanted - A Critique of Experience

The realisation of the Federation's religious ideal depends upon the existence among the leaders of each national movement of a will to understand and appreciate the intellectual and spiritual contribution which other national movements can make to the Federation's total life. No community will ever be formed whose prospective members regard their participation in it as chiefly significant because it provides them with an opportunity to point out the superior merits of their own position or the limitations of the positions of other prospective members. A community only comes into being when the men who wish to form it discover that they have certain basic interests in common, and for the sake of these supreme common interests prefer to regard the less important variations in ideology which separate them not as exclusive barriers but as opportunities for cross-fertilisation.

For a number of years one of the most noticeable variations in the life of the Federation has been the contrast between the "Anglo-Saxon" and "Continental European" points of view. This contrast has appeared with such regularity in the discussions of Federation meetings that it is often assumed as a permanent if unwelcome characteristic of our common fellowship. This assumption has unfortunately given rise to the identification of particular points of view with particular movements in the

form of national or racial labels. As a matter of fact these points of view are not determined by geography. Both are to be found in America and Germany, in England and China, in France and India. It is only the lack of better definitions and our innate tendency to make sweeping generalisations that lead us to use these "stenographic" terms as if they stood for quite definite realities. These labels serve to stereotype our thinking about each other. They represent ready made presuppositions which imply inherent fixed characteristics in other groups. As such their existence effectively prevents a fresh and unprejudiced examination of the merits of the respective points of view.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that discussions between "Continental Europeans" and "Anglo-Saxons" often degenerate into an attempt by each side to convince the other side of the error of its way as defined by these labels. This method of dealing with differences is of course absolutely fruitless. Before effective discussion can take place it is necessary to have agreement as to the issues to be discussed. It is equally necessary that each participant should exhibit no less zeal in recognising points of agreement than in examining the ideas which seem to be antithetical.

I would like to suggest that the central question which "Anglo-Saxons" and "Continental Europeans" need to discuss together is the relation of "experience" to religion. I mean by "experience" the experiences known to consciousness in this world.

There is a tendency in Europe to imagine that "Anglo-Saxons" look to "experience" alone as the source of faith, and that consequently their faith has become a very mundane and superficial thing — in fact has ceased to be faith at all and lingers on in name only as little more than man's self-confidence in his own morality. There is an equal tendency in the "Anglo-Saxon" world to believe that Europeans disregard experience to such an extent that their religion exists in a kind of spiritual vacuum, with the result that it becomes intellectually sterile and ethically impotent. The sense of contrast between these points of view is perhaps not as vivid as the words I have used may seem to indicate. It exists

none the less and as long as it continues to form a part of the furniture of our minds, the realisation of a world community of Christian students is rendered extremely difficult.

It is essential that first of all the real issues should be ascertained, and when once ascertained that they should be removed from the mental atmosphere of insuperable barriers to the mental atmosphere of opportunities for cross-fertilisation. As a prelude to understanding the real issues all labels must be once and for all discarded. We must refuse to allow ourselves the thought "Ah! that superficial concept is so 'Anglo-Saxon'!" or "Ah! that theological irrelevancy is so 'European'!".

If the central issue is the issue of "experience", everyone of us who is in any way related to the student fields concerned with this issue should attempt to clarify his mind as to the function of "experience" in the development of the life of the spirit. We need a critique of "experience".

The time has not come when a fully developed critique which might pave the way for resolving the "European-Anglo-Saxon" antithesis can be advanced. However, I believe that such a critique is possible. The main lines along which it might develop are fairly clear. It would on the one hand recognise the very definite limits to "experience". It would admit that "experience" does not provide the material out of which faith grows; that the logic of faith is not the logic of "experience"; and that the sequence of "experience" can never be relied upon to lead to a belief in God as revealed in Jesus Christ. As Dr. Fritz Künkel has recently pointed out psychology at its best can only define the vacuum in personality; its function ceases where the vacuum begins. The critique would further affirm that the Christian faith exists in its own right unconditioned by experience and independent of the necessity of adjustment to its social environment.

That is one side of the critique. There is another side which in my judgement is equally indispensable. Having recognised the limits of "experience" the critique would go on to assert the importance of "experience" within its own proper limits. It is through "experience" and "experience"

alone that we acquire a perception of significance. It is through "experience" that we learn the significance of the spiritual values of our faith for this life. Consequently it is only as a result of realistic sensitiveness to the experiences of this life that a robust Christian character can be developed. The existence of a Christian ethic depends upon the realisation of this function of "experience". Neither an adequate personal or social ethic can be achieved when men are insensitive to the significance of the individual and group relationships which comprise the greater part of their daily existence. Insensitiveness to the ethical issues posed by contemporary civilization leads inevitably to pharisaism. Faith without ethical consequence is dead.

I have sketched in briefest outline one form which a critique of "experience" might take. I have done so in the hope that someone else may be stimulated to take up this line of thought and carry it further. If we could regard the development of such a critique as a task in which both sides were cooperating equally, it is conceivable that its construction might contribute appreciably to the realisation of that world community of Christian students in which we believe.

F.P.M.

Uebersetzung

Die Verwirklichung des Weltbundgedankens hängt davon ab, ob die Führer der nationalen Bewegungen gewillt sind, die intellektuellen und geistlichen Anregungen anderer nationaler Bewegungen zu dem Gesamtleben des Weltbundes zu verstehen und zu schätzen. Eine wahre Gemeinschaft kann nie entstehen, wenn diejenigen, die sie ausmachen wollen, ihre eigene Teilnahme nur deshalb für wertvoll halten, weil sie ihnen Gelegenheit gibt, zu zeigen wieviel grösser die Werte ihrer eigenen Einstellung sind im Vergleich mit den nur beschränkten Ansichten der anderen möglichen Mitglieder. Eine Gemeinschaft kann nur dann entstehen, wenn die, die in sie aufgenommen werden möchten, erkennen, dass ein gemeinsames Interesse alle verbindet, um dessentwillen sie die weniger wichtigen Verschiedenheiten der Ansichten nicht als trennende Grenzen sondern als Möglichkeiten zur gegenseitigen Befruchtung ansehen.

Seit einer Reihe von Jahren ist eine der sichtbarsten Verschiedenheiten innerhalb des Weltbundes der Gegensatz zwischen der "angelsächsischen" und "europäischen" Anschauung gewesen. Diese Gegensätzlichkeit ist in den Diskussionen der Weltbundzusammenkünfte mit einer solchen Regelmässigkeit in Erscheinung getreten, dass man sie oft als ein ständiges aber wenig willkommenes Charakteristikum unserer gemeinsamen Verbundenheit angesehen hat. Und leider hat man aus dieser Annahme heraus ganz bestimmte Ansichten mit ganz bestimmten Bewegungen identifiziert und ihnen dadurch gewissermassen ein nationales und Rassenschild umgehängt. Und so sind unsere Ansichten über einander stereotyp geworden. Als solche hindern sie uns aber, unvoreingenommen die Werte der betreffenden Ansichten zu prüfen.

Und so enden die Diskussionen zwischen "Europäern" und "Angelsachsen" oft darin, dass die eine Seite versucht, die andere von ihrer irrtümlichen Denkweise, wie sie durch diese Umhängeschilder typisiert ist, zu überzeugen. Ein solcher Versuch muss natürlich immer unfruchtbar bleiben. Eine wirksame Diskussion kann nur dann stattfinden, wenn man sich zunächst darüber einig ist, was man diskutieren will. Ferner müssen alle Teilnehmer mit ebenso grossem Eifer die gemeinsamen Ansichten wie die antithetischen Ideen zu erfassen suchen.

Und so möchte ich als eine der zentralsten Fragen, die die "Angelsachsen" und "Europäer" besprechen sollten, die des Verhältnisses der "Erfahrung" zur Religion vorschlagen.

In Europa neigt man allgemein zu der Ansicht, dass die "Erfahrung" die einzige Quelle des Glaubens für die Angelsachsen sei, und dass dieser Glaube infolgedessen sehr verweltlicht und oberflächlich ist — ja tatsächlich aufgehört hat, Glaube zu sein und gewissermassen nur noch diesen Namen trägt für etwas, was nicht viel mehr ist, als ein Vertrauen in die eigene Moral. Die angelsächsische Welt auf der anderen Seite glaubt, dass die Europäer die „Erfahrung“ unterschätzen, ihre Religion nur ein gewisses geistiges Vakuum sei und schliesslich geistig steril und ethisch unwirksam wird. Vielleicht ist der Gegensatz dieser beiden Ansichten in Wirklichkeit nicht so gross, als ihn meine Worte vermuten lassen. Trotzdem ist er vorhanden, und solange er unser Bewusstsein beherrscht, wird die Verwirklichung einer Weltgemeinschaft christlicher Studenten unerhört gehemmt.

Es ist daher wichtig, dass zunächst die tatsächlich auseinandergehenden Punkte erkannt werden, und dass man sich dann bemüht, sie nicht mehr als unüberwindliche Hemmnisse zu sehen, sondern als Gelegenheiten zur gegenseitigen Befruchtung. Das erste muss aber

sein, dass alle Umhängeschilder verschwinden. Gedanken wie, „o, diese oberflächliche Anschauung ist so angelsächsisch“, oder „ach, dieses Sichverlieren in der Theologie ist so europäisch“, dürfen wir nicht mehr bei uns aufkommen lassen.

Wenn aber die Hauptstreitfrage die der „Erfahrung“ ist, dann sollte jeder von uns versuchen, sich selber klar zu werden, welchen Platz die „Erfahrung“ in der Entwicklung des christlichen Lebens einnimmt. Wir brauchen eine „Kritik der Erfahrung“. Wir sind bisher noch nicht so weit, dass wir durch eine wirklich reife Kritik den Weg zum Ausgleich der europäisch-angelsächsischen Antithesis ebnen könnten. Aber doch glaube ich, dass eine solche Kritik möglich ist. Die Hauptlinien, in denen sie sich entwickeln könnte, sind klar. Zunächst gilt es, die Grenzen der Erfahrung zu erkennen. Wir müssen zugeben, dass aus der Erfahrung nicht die Kräfte entstehen, aus denen der Glaube wächst und dass Glaubenslogik nicht das gleiche ist wie Erfahrungslogik; und ferner dass man sich nie darauf verlassen kann, dass die „Erfahrung“ uns zu dem Glauben an Gott führt, wie Er sich in Jesus Christus offenbart hat. Dr. Fritz Künkel hat kürzlich über die Psychologie gesagt, dass sie höchstens das Vakuum im Menschen definieren kann, dass aber ihre Wirksamkeit da aufhört, wo die des Vakuums einsetzt. Die Kritik würde auch bestätigen, dass der christliche Glaube seinen Grund in sich selbst findet, und dass er im Tiefsten unabhängig ist von dem sozialen Milieu oder von der Erfahrung.

Dies die eine Seite der Kritik, die andere scheint mir nicht weniger wichtig. Nachdem sie die Grenzen der Erfahrung erkannt hat, müsste die Kritik fortfahren, die Wichtigkeit der Erfahrung in ihren eigenen Grenzen zu verfechten. Nur durch die Erfahrung erkennen wir die Bedeutung der Glaubenswerte für dieses Leben. Infolgedessen kann ein fester christlicher Charakter sich nur dann entwickeln, wenn er wirklich empfindlich ist gegenüber den Erfahrungen des Lebens. Das Vorhandensein einer christlichen Ethik hängt davon ab, ob wir uns dieser Aufgabe der Erfahrung bewusst werden. Weder eine persönliche noch eine allgemeine Ethik kann aufgebaut werden, wenn die Menschen kein Gefühl für die Bedeutung der Beziehungen des Einzelnen oder der Gruppe haben, die den grössten Teil ihres täglichen Daseins ausmachen. Unempfindlichkeit gegenüber den ethischen Streitfragen, wie sie sich uns in der heutigen Kultur stellen, führt unweigerlich zu Pharisäertum. Glaube ohne ethische Wirkungen ist tot.

Dies ist ganz kurz skizziert eine Form, die die „Kritik der Erfahrung“ annehmen könnte. Ich habe sie dargelegt in der Hoffnung, dass jemand anderes die Gedankengänge aufgreifen und weiter-

führen möge. Wenn wir dazu kämen, dass wir die Entwicklung einer solchen Kritik als eine gemeinsame Aufgabe ansehen könnten, so wird dies sicherlich zu der Verwirklichung einer Weltgemeinschaft christlicher Studenten, an die wir glauben, beitragen.

The Crisis of Psychology

Emil BRUNNER

Psychology the Meeting Place of Three Disciplines.

There are three disciplines which are entitled to make a contribution to the realm of psychology. They are : theology, philosophy and natural science. If we look for a rather wide definition of psychology which all these three may accept, we may call it the science about the subjective, or the subject. Natural science is concerned with it because the subjective is always bound to the human organism. The human body is the inevitable companion of the psychical functions. It is therefore natural to study these functions in the same way as one studies the body, that is empirically, as the result of verifiable causes. Thus physiological psychology is able to discover certain important laws of relation between the physical and the mental or within the mental realm. We would be lacking in the most elementary fairness if we did not record with gratitude what the experimental work of men like Helmholtz, Fechner, Wundt and their disciples have contributed to our understanding of mental processes.

But it is not difficult to see that the approach according to the methods of natural science is not exhaustive or adequate where the essential elements of the object-matter of psychology are concerned. For the "subject" cannot be approached as if it were a given subject. The objective is always presupposed if we speak about object. There are only objects for the subject, and we cannot therefore put the subject on the dissecting table. The scientist himself is a subject. All his research and knowledge are in the end nothing else but the taking in of the objective world into

his subjectivity. In that sense (not spacially) the subject is always greater than the object. That which knows cannot be considered as an object among other objects of knowledge. Every deeper philosophy must therefore finally protest against the misunderstanding which arises if the subject is considered as an object among other objects. The consideration of this relation between subject and object is the very theme of all philosophy worthy of the name. And the discipline of philosophy has therefore a right to participate in the discussion about the problem of the soul.

But if philosophy becomes conscious of this question of subjectivity it is faced with a difficult problem. For if subjectivity is really always the presupposition and never a given object of knowledge then we must conclude that the only reality is such as is found within the subject. Reality is then created by the subject. The subject itself is the very centre of reality. We need only to mention Fichte or the philosophy of the Vedanta to indicate the power of this type of thought.

At this point theology has its contribution to make. For it speaks of a subjectivity which is limited and final, which cannot be observed but which we come to know in faith. Faith is that type of subjectivity which is conscious that it does not create but that it has been created. It is that type of knowledge of which one can say paradoxically that it consists in being the object of knowledge, a correlation to the divine revelation. Theology, as the advocate of Christian faith, says that man cannot be understood as an object or as a subject but only as a subject determined by the creative Spirit of God. Thus theology justifies its claim to be heard in the discussion of the psychological problem.

The Chimera of a Purely Empirical Psychology.

After this short introduction we come to our central subject. Let me begin by formulating this thesis : There is no psychology which is not determined by its connection with a general conception of the world (Weltanschauung).

All psychologists who believe in a purely empirical study of the psychical phenomena which has nothing to do with metaphysics, speculation or theology, will consider this thesis as an attack on their work. They are right. My thesis aims at them. Let me give a sharper formulation. A purely empirical psychology is a chimera. There has never been one and there never will be one. I do not mean that because of our human weakness we are not able to eliminate certain troublesome influences, just as, for instance, we are not able to create an absolute vacuum by pumping. I mean to say that even the *ideal* of a purely empirical psychology is a misunderstanding. I could prove this by reference to the history of psychology which teaches us very clearly that the psychology of every period and every group corresponds to its general philosophy of life, its fundamental attitude regarding the totality of reality. Plato, the idealist, had an idealistic psychology, Aristotle, the realist, a realistic one, Epicurus, the materialist, a materialistic one, Augustine, the Christian, a Christian one. And the same is true of our own time, although the greater complexity of the situation and the lack of clear definitions makes it easier to show this in the case of larger groups than in the case of single individuals. While until the beginning of this century psychology was dominated by naturalism and positivism and therefore chiefly interested in the physiological method, it has later been transformed by the revival of idealism and, even more recently, by the new romanticism. These last two influences have now, in many circles, largely ousted the physiological interest.

But however important this historical reflection may be, it is not sufficient to prove the truth of our thesis. We must go back to more fundamental considerations.

The conviction of the exclusively empirical psychologist that the phenomena of human consciousness can be explored by purely scientific observation, is based on the idea that the human soul or human consciousness is an object among objects, for we can only study objectively that which is an object among other objects or that which is a thing among other things. The empirical psychologist might answer by

saying that his effort to find out how far the phenomena of human consciousness can be explained by the method of objective study is only a hypothesis to further his work. But if he says that, then he has given up the thesis that is now predominant among so many, that psychology in order to be science *must* use the empirical and objective approach.

But it is necessary to explain this general consideration by reference to various types of psychology. In order to shorten my presentation I shall develop some general deductive principles about the various possible conceptions of life and then test these principles by the way of induction, that is, by the actual situation of psychological research today.

Three Philosophies which determine Psychological Standpoints.

There are three great philosophic systems which are all concerned with the relation of subject and object. The first aims at the subordination of the subject to the object in such a way that only that is considered real which is objective. The second subordinates the object to the subject. The third finds ultimate truth neither in the one nor in the other, but in the identity of both. With all the reservations which one must make in generalising and simplifying philosophy to such a degree I would call the first naturalism, the second idealism and the third pantheism. Although these names are often used in a somewhat different connotation, in the realm of psychology we find fundamental tendencies which correspond exactly to these three chief philosophies. Let us try to characterise each of them.

Naturalistic Psychology.

The psychology which corresponds to the system of objectivity is based on the empirical approach. It orients itself consciously or unconsciously towards the ideal of natural science, that is, to discover causal relationships between simple and irreducible elements or, more precisely to conceive psychological reality as quantitative and dominated by functional laws which can be fixed mathematically.

In these sentences we recognise immediately the characteristics of the so-called association psychology which can also be called physiological psychology because it can never arrive at a quantitative determination except by introducing the physical corollaries. At first its working hypothesis proved itself to be extraordinarily useful. Many psychological processes could be reduced to more simple elements. Moreover, it seemed possible to establish an analogy between causation in the physical world and the so-called laws of association. And finally the psycho-physical relationship made it possible to discover laws of mathematical regularity such as the laws of Fechner and Weber. But, after having worked for fifty years according to these principles the psychologist had finally to admit that the results of this exact scientific psychology were relatively few. Most of them seemed to throw light on the most peripheral realms of human life only, namely on those where, according to the popular conception, the soul and the body meet. The more the interest in the higher and deeper regions of psychical life grew, the more clearly it was shown that the analogy with physical life was misleading and the more sharply the method of natural science began to be attacked. Deeper study revealed that these laws of association were not real analogies to the physical laws and that therefore an exclusively causal explanation of the deeper realms of human life was out of the question. New categories such as "creative synthesis" and "apperception", which were foreign to the language of older psychology, had to be introduced and showed the failure of the older method.

"Understanding" Psychology.

The antipode of this naturalistic psychology is idealistic psychology. It does not look on the whole in the light of the parts, but on the parts in the light of the whole. It does not try to explain, but rather to "understand". Its method is therefore not to discover causal relationships, but rather "laws of meaning". It is not analytic, but synthetic. If we follow its most consistent systems we see that it tries to understand the individual soul in the light of the whole

of life, the general "meaning" of life. At this point I may mention the name of Eduard Spranger who is perhaps the most energetic and successful representative of this psychology of understanding. If one goes from the dissecting room of a psychological laboratory of the type of Wundt, where psychology without a soul is the ideal, into the free joyous world of Spranger's idealism, it is like coming into fresh air, not only because man regains his worth in this conception, but also because one is stimulated by a new insight into the things that are really humanly valuable. If I may try to concentrate the rich psychology of Spranger into a few sentences I might mention the following characteristics :

The central thesis is that the totality of "meaning" is something new and irreducible compared with the elements. This totality of meaning is however, not only a whole in itself, but also something objective in relation to every individual. It does not cause but it determines. The psychical life of man can therefore only be understood in relation to that totality of meaning and every single individual must be conceived of as participating in that objective world. It is clear that this spiritual psychology is just as closely connected with the central notions of idealism as the first named psychology is with the central notions of naturalism.

Romantic Psychology.

But since this psychology does not answer all questions a third type of approach has appeared which enjoys considerable popularity today. The starting-point of this psychology is neither nature nor spirit, but the individual unity of both, the individual totality which must be distinguished from the totality of meaning. We could also say that it starts from the totality of life where it considers the exterior and from the totality of experience where it considers the interior. This totality of individual life reveals itself outwardly as the organism of the body. This organism cannot be divided up. It is something absolutely new, namely a teleological system in relation to the matter of which it consists. The fundamental principle of the physical is, however, not itself physical but psychical. It is however not psychical in the

sense of conscious life, but rather unconsciously so. This psychology tries to show how the unconscious totality not only makes the body into an organism but also produces conscious life in its creative and original aspects. This approach is intimately connected with the so-called philosophy of identity and pantheistic romanticism. Everyone who knows of the work of these psychologists (e.g. Klages and Carus), must admit that they have given us new insight into the nature of man and especially into the physiognomy of man, such as we could not get from the naturalistic or idealistic psychology. While the first looks for causal relations and the second for the relations of "meaning" this third tendency tries to understand the correlation between the psychological phenomena and between them and the outward bodily expression. It tries to discover the unity of the expression of every individuality or, as it often says, of every character.

These three forms of psychology do not exist in such abstract purity in the scientific world of today, but it is not difficult to prove that practically all tendencies which consider themselves as scientific psychology tend towards one of these three directions or try to combine two of them. The present day form of naturalistic psychology, for instance, is no longer the elementary psychology of Wundt, but rather a combination of it with the idea of the organic. That is to say it lies between the purposive individual psychology and the association psychology. We find this combination, for instance, in the behaviouristic tendency so prevalent in America today. Similarly we could classify psycho-analysis, especially in its newer forms, (e.g. Jung), as a romantic psychology of individuality with a strong naturalistic influence. It is possible to detect the traces of both philosophies in the work of all leading psycho-analysts. There is, however, this interesting fact to be noticed. While the romantic psychologists of individuality and the idealistic psychologists of the spirit do not deny the relationship of their psychology to their *Weltanschauung* it is still the characteristic of naturalism and positivism that it does not acknowledge such a relationship. It pretends to what

might be called a philosophical innocence which nobody can take seriously except the naturalists themselves.

The Crisis of Psychology.

The antithesis of these various tendencies is clearly realised today. It has led to the "crisis of psychology" about which Karl Böhler has written. It would seem however that few are conscious of the true import of this crisis. For there are many who try to avoid the question of the true psychology by combining the various existing ones. This attitude is not surprising. For, if it has been recognised that we can learn about the chief psychological tendencies from all three — and who can deny it? — why should we not try to combine all three? The only argument against combination is that it can only satisfy the empirical psychologist who expects the deepest insight into human life from the progress of experimental research. If, however, our deduction of the psychological tendencies from related philosophies is justified, we can only expect that the results of the various schools will partially complete each other. And we must also expect that the very presuppositions of each will hinder the progress of the others. A psychology, which has as its ideal to avoid the notion of the soul or of an "I", will not only in its basic principles, but in every detail conflict with a psychology which pretends that it is waste of time to talk about any other phenomena, except those which are modifications of the soul or the "Ego". A real co-operation of these various schools could therefore never be built on the simple idea of combination.

If our description is right we must further conclude that a synthesis is just as impossible as a combination. For the three philosophies or systems which I have mentioned are mutually so exclusive that a real synthesis cannot be worked out between them. In the history of philosophy we find of course many attempts at synthesis, but even a superficial study of these shows us that these always emanate from second-rate philosophers and that they never have that convincing power which characterises the one-sided but consistent systems of idealism, pantheism and naturalism.

These three systems have each certain synthetic elements, but as real philosophies they put one thought at the centre of their system, be it the object or the subject or the unknowable unity of both. They are irreconcilable and can never defeat each other. The desire of psychology to put an end to this eternal conflict is natural, but it cannot be fulfilled.

Enter the Theologian.

The crisis of psychology is not therefore merely a chance event which will soon belong to history. It has been a permanent crisis since the days of Plato and Aristotle. It is in this situation that the theologian begins to take part in the discussion, not as the outsider, who enjoys the fight of the others, not as the referee who has the synthetical insight which the others do not possess, but as the man who takes the word "crisis" somewhat more seriously than most others are willing to take it. For the three groups of psychologies or philosophies which we have described, crisis means a passing difficulty which can be met by improvement of method, by deeper thinking or by more careful observation or intuition. But theology is that type of thought that has its starting point in the crisis of all principles. Theological thought starts with the realisation that a final synthesis is impossible and why it is impossible. It is not impossible because of the insufficiency of our human mind, although this can only gradually be overcome, but it is impossible in every act of our thinking. For human thought does not bring us continually nearer to the final solution of the enigma. In such a case every advance involves a corresponding withdrawal. Every approximation means in this case also greater distance. This may seem somewhat obscure. I will therefore try to illustrate it by referring to one of the central problems of psychology. The central idea of all psychology is the idea of human personality. It is a real advance in modern psychological science that this is again widely recognised as a truism. In understanding personality the purely empirical psychology does not lead us much further. Personality is an insoluble unity but naturalistic

psychology knows only of the composite. It arrives only at an apparent unity, which is in reality nothing but the composition of single elements. It thinks of character as the sum total of various qualities. Romantic psychology seems to make a greater contribution. The unity of the individual is its very starting point. But it substitutes two other conceptions for the idea of personality, namely, individuality and soul. These however are not the same as personality. Individuality is to be found in all living beings. Personality is always *human* personality. For personality means the capacity to discover "meaning". It also means self-determination. Individuality has neither of these two characteristics.

This leads us to the idealistic conception. Its great contribution to human thought is that it has thought through the idea of human personality in its full significance. Plato found that the first characteristic of personality was the capacity to discover meaning. Kant contributed the second: personality is self-determination.

What has this to do with psychology? Just as the biologist cannot work without the conception of organic totality, so psychology cannot proceed without borrowing the idea of personality from idealistic psychology. The psychologist who would refuse to do this is left with the raw material only. He tries to understand a painting of Rembrandt without reference to the artistic idea and personality behind it. Wherever the crisis of psychology is really taken seriously idealistic philosophy is discovered to be victorious over the other conceptions, because it goes deeper. But the question remains whether it is really adequate to the understanding of the reality of human life. We must answer that question negatively. Although we are thankful for the depth of idealistic thought, we find it incapable of solving the deepest enigma of human life. For this is the weak spot of all idealism, that it does not take the empirical personality, man as he is, seriously enough. It distinguishes between man as part of this world, determined by the laws of the empirical world and man as part of the realm of reason, of the absolute. Thus it cuts human life in two parts and

does not find a relation between them. But this dualism is not the real one. For it forgets that element of reality which cannot be omitted from a truly adequate view of life. It does not recognise the existence of evil. We cannot prove that evil exists. But we can appeal to the sense of truth. What I am now going to say is only for those who know of the existence of evil as a reality in human life. The real dualism is not between an empirical life and life according to Reason but between man as related to the divine law and his actual existence in which he lives in contradiction to that law.

The Crisis of Psychology and the Crisis of Man.

It is this conception — the reality of evil — that constitutes the deepest crisis of psychology. No psychology and no philosophy but only faith can grasp it. All three types of psychology have found a partial truth: naturalism, the relation to nature, romantic individualism, the totality of the individual, idealism, the freedom of man and his relation to a significant Whole. But it is not by combining these three that we come to a unified conception. We must transcend them all in order to put the Christian conceptions of the finite personality and of evil at the beginning. For this is the characteristic of the psychology or anthropology of Christian faith that it takes these two paradoxical principles seriously: 1. Man is spiritual but finite, bound to the physical world and therefore he is not God but creature. 2. Man is determined by the divine law but he exists in contradiction to this law. This is the real dualism of human reality. It is not the dualism as we find it in idealism, that is, the contradiction between nature and spirit. It is the contradiction between the spirit of the creature and the spirit of the creator, which expresses itself in the fact that man forgets his spirituality and thus makes himself an animal, or that he forgets his finiteness and makes himself a God. Since this contradiction is in the very nature of man, every synthesis in which man tries to understand himself without reference to this contradiction is a misunderstanding and

can never be a real solution of the human problem. The problem is in the very existence of man and not merely in his thought. It can not therefore be solved rationally, but only by real change in his existence, by deliverance.

The crisis of psychology finally, is only one among the many expressions of the crisis of man generally. That is the reason why it cannot be fully understood in any one of the three philosophies or in the corresponding psychologies. Man can never understand himself in his own enigmatic character. He only begins to understand when he ceases to explain himself and lets himself be explained by that which is beyond himself. That is to say the real understanding of the problem of personality and of the centre of human life is not a matter of scientific research, but of faith. I am therefore not astonished that the deepest insight into the human soul throughout the ages, has not come from the professional psychologists nor from the philosophers, but from those men who have discovered the deepest paradox of personality in their passionate inner struggle for God.

What then is our conclusion as to the scientific approach to psychology? Let me repeat that psychology without a *Weltanschauung* does not exist. The question is not whether or not we should work with philosophic categories of thought. The question is — which of all these categories are the right ones? This decision cannot be taken within the realm of psychology. It belongs to the realm of discussion between the various conceptions of life. As has been the case in the past so it will be in the future that each will approach psychology in his capacity of naturalist, idealist, pantheist or Christian. The Christian approaches psychology as a Christian because he finds in his faith a truth which throws light on the nature of man and of the soul. He cannot prove the truth of Christian faith or of its psychology, but he can demonstrate how this faith may throw light on the permanent crisis of psychology and how the recognition of this crisis may prepare the way for the deepest psychological insight. This fundamental insight is that an understanding of human psychology is only possible from the standpoint of faith in the creation of personal man,

in the existence of a personal God and in the fact of the anti-divine self-determination of man. Only that psychology which relates all its findings to these two points will be truly realistic and truly personal. Only such a psychology will be able to combine the idealistic insight into the relation of man to God and the realistic insight of his finiteness. Only such a psychology will not cut the human personality in two essentially different parts and will take account of the characteristic paradox of human life. This psychology however must not try to solve the problem simply by research or by thought, but must recognise it as in the very character of all existence. It is a problem which can only be solved in faith.

Although a rational discussion about these fundamental convictions is impossible, such a psychology of faith must not avoid the task of demonstrating the truth of its principles as working hypotheses in psychological research. It will have to show in its work that it can throw light such as no psychology can give on the most important questions of psychology.

It is clear that this task does not exclude cooperation with other types of psychology. Christian faith is not the synthesis of the three chief psychological tendencies, but it is here that we recognise that all our statements about the soul must have a three-fold character and why this is so, we must consider it in its finiteness, in its individual totality and in its spirituality. As the three chief psychological standpoints are faced with Christian faith they reach a crisis in which all three have to give up their claim to final validity. Thus psychology becomes really the meeting point of science, philosophy and theology. For the soul is neither simply objective finiteness nor simply free spirit. It is the unity of finiteness and spirit determined by God and can only be understood in relation to its origin, that is to say in faith.

The Challenge of Psychology to Christianity

Z. F. WILLIS

"Dismiss the idea that natural law may swallow up religion; it cannot even tackle the multiplication table single-handed." *Professor A.S. Eddington, "Science and the Unseen World."*

"In the same way, at the present day and during the last twenty years, psychologists have approached the question of the validity of religious experience along psychological lines, not always realising that, by the very method they have adopted, they are challenging or denying that validity. In other words, just as psychology cannot do justice to the validity of knowledge, psychology cannot do justice to the validity of religion." *Dr. William Brown in "Science, Religion, and Reality."*

"For us every department of human knowledge has been revolutionised: biology, psychology, and philosophy have made havoc of traditional orthodoxy; we can no longer start our theology with certain general principles and select our data to illustrate them; and when we look at the facts they seem to many of us flatly irreconcilable with the religion of Jesus." *Canon C.E. Raven at the Liverpool Conference, January 1929.*

From many points of view, compromise may rightly be regarded as the essence of life. But it is just because of this that there is danger in too easy compromise, and grave danger when the motive to accept any particular compromise proceeds from a desire to be accounted among the intellectually respectable. In no range of human experience has this danger been recently more evident than in regard to what are popularly termed the relations between Science and Religion, and more particularly between Science and Christianity. There has been, and still is, a great deal of loose talk concerning this vital issue and an eagerness to assume that for those who know and understand the questions involved nothing remains but to applaud and to proclaim the happy unity of purpose and outlook of men of Science and men of Christianity. Unity of purpose there certainly is on many hands, but in regard to outlook the situation is still critical,

for as Professor McDougall has told us in his last book "Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution", "though Science has turned pacifist and though Religion is prepared for defensive warfare only, the conflict is not yet ended. Materialism of the cruder sort is no longer respectable; but its place has been taken by a doctrine or a point of view, which, though it does not so flatly negate all religious hopes and moral aspirations, cannot easily be reconciled with either. Materialism in the literal sense has gone, never to return; but Science still renders an account of Man and the universe which, if not positively hostile, is yet adverse to every form of Religion, however broadly defined, and obstructive to every form of moral effort. And this account is the more dangerous to these interests just because it avoids the crudities of the older Materialism and is rendered in subtle and elusive terms, in terms difficult to grasp or define, and therefore in propositions difficult to refute." Statements such as these obviously depend in no small measure upon one's conception of Science and of Christianity, and it is impossible to enter into the fundamental issues thus involved within the compass of such an article as this, the purpose of which is rather to discuss briefly certain of the more important aspects of the challenge now offered to Christianity by the most recent development of scientific investigation, psychology — the baby of the sciences. It was pointed out many years ago that whereas the conflict between Science and Religion had begun in the field of geology and passed on into that of biology, its most critical phase would arise when the methods of Science really impenetrated the study of human personality. It is just this impenetration that constitutes psychology.

What is it, in a sentence, that the geologists, the biologists, and it may be added, the medical men, have been doing all these years, though most often only indirectly and unwittingly? Surely it is that they have been engaged in erecting a creed, or if you will, an edifice, of naturalism, which even in spite of the intentions of many of them was bound to become an increasing challenge, and an elusive and attractive, if equally illusive and disappointing, alternative to that mystical attitude and apprehension which lies at the root of all religion

and so manifestly at the heart of Christianity, and thus ultimately to Christianity itself. Now, among contemporary English writers, Professor Julian Huxley may very well be regarded as a good witness of the general scientific standpoint, and we may therefore turn appropriately to his recently published confession of faith "What I Believe or Religion without Revelation". For his lucidity and candour we may well be grateful, and nothing could be plainer than the passage in which he tells us that in his view "it is perfectly clear to those who have eyes to see that the progress of psychology is today putting the final storey on the great edifice of naturalism... Today... we are acquiring a knowledge of the laws of the mind and the conditions of its working which are bringing it too into line with the rest. This new knowledge is giving us an entirely new insight into the meaning of the phenomena we have been used to describing under the names of revelation, conversion, grace, salvation, demoniac possession, miracles of healing, prophecy, communion with the divine, and many others. It is showing us that the phenomena thus described, though perfectly definite facts of experience, need not be interpreted in the traditional way. They do not require us to postulate supernatural beings outside ourselves as their cause; they can be accounted for by the natural workings of the individual human mind."

The fact that Professor Huxley is not himself a psychologist will have enabled him to make a more detached appraisal than might otherwise have been possible, and his opinion is therefore all the more valuable in regard to the implications of much recent psychological investigation, and this is summed up in the phrase in which he describes those results as "putting the final storey on the great edifice of naturalism". Furthermore, what he would have us understand by naturalism may be safely inferred from the sub-title of his book — "Religion without Revelation". Thus we are faced with the direct challenge that psychology is reducing our faith to mere subjectivism. Nor shall we escape this challenge by comforting ourselves with the thought that such an opinion as that of Professor Huxley is in no small degree out of date even within its own field. For the issue still remains

when we have taken the fullest consolation from the reflection that the best men of Science now recognise that their world, the external world, is but a world of shadows, and added to this the recollection that no less an authority than Professor Eddington has told us in "The Nature of the Physical World" that "Science withdraws its moral opposition to free-will", and that "those who maintain a deterministic theory of mental activity must not do so with the idea that they are thereby making it more conformable with our experimental knowledge of the laws of inorganic nature". It is, of course, of the utmost importance that in the more mature and robust fields of physics and biology there is increasing evidence that even if Science as such can never be "on the side of the angels", it no longer regards those who are as mere victims of superstition and subjectivism. But the issue must be squarely faced in regard to the challenge of the scientific baby. For not only does psychology possess the vigorous enthusiasm and energy of youth, but what is much more important, its very infancy is due to the fact that it was only when the methods and the tools of Science had been forged and tempered in more tangible enterprises that they could be applied to those mental and spiritual processes which are in the last analysis the very stuff out of which religious experience "emerges" — to use one of the fashionable bio-psychological catchwords. To examine this challenge in detail would be quite impossible here, but some indication may be attempted of the lines along which the problem may perhaps be most usefully approached.

In the first place, in so far as the psychologist presents his challenge in the name of Science, he may be reminded that in so doing he must show reason why he is not to be regarded as working and speaking within the now universally admitted limitations of scientific investigation and judgment. Psychology, that is to say, is not a normative science because it can claim to formulate norms — a common misunderstanding — but because, like logic, ethics, and aesthetics, it investigates those realms of experience which are concerned with norms. The business of logic is "to tell us how we think *not how to think*". (Professor Baillie, "The Interpretation of Religion."

Italics mine.) Similarly, the ultimate business of psychology is to tell us, if it can, how we believe *not what to believe*.

Then the exponent of faith may well inquire rather closely into the precise meaning of the term emergence. This aspect of the answer to the challenge of psychology has been very ably stated by Father L.S. Thornton in his recently published volume "The Incarnate Lord". As he there points out, "The new cannot, properly speaking, emerge out of an existing situation. It may appear thus emerging; but it must enter from beyond. In the case of the organic series new factors are continually entering into the situation. They are not derived from the repetitive series of events. From whence then do the new factors come? These new factors are manifested in the form of, or by means of, principles of unity which transcend the routines of bare succession in increasing measure. The new factors themselves flow in from the transcending background of the series of events through the transcending principles of unity". Side by side with these profound sentences we may reflect upon the more provocative but no less fundamental rejoinder of Professor McDougall in the book already quoted to those who use the magic wand of emergence with loose and clumsy superficiality. "A demon chemist might have produced any kind of crystal at the dawn of the sidereal system (if there was such a dawn) given a sufficient power of controlling physical conditions. Suppose also that his knowledge and powers of manipulation of material things had been so great that he could have arranged atoms, molecules, and electrons in a system exactly resembling the material structure of a fertilised human ovum. Would that system, given suitable material environment, have developed into a man? The emergent evolutionist says: Yes. I say: No; there is no good reason to suppose that it would have done so".

In the third place, when it is insisted that personal experience of God is really reduced by psychological investigation to nothing more than the product of our imagination busy in the service of our subjective desires and fears — an assertion, by the way, by no means as new as some psychological writers are wont to assume — two questions at once

present themselves. First, upon what evidence is such a tremendous assertion to be accepted? Its most eminent modern exponent, Freud, has obviously relied in large measure upon evidence from abnormal subjects, and it is not without significance that William James did much the same in many of his inquiries. But no less an authority than the distinguished psycho-therapist, Dr. William Brown, has warned us that "to generalise and use the pathological conception of projection in dealing with normal psychology is an illegitimate use of the concept. The normal mind is one thing, the abnormal mind is another, and the mere fact that abnormal tendencies may be present in any man, however apparently normal, does not alter that distinction."

Yet, as Professor Baillie has so wisely pointed out, "the truth is that the verities of religion are often very far from being what men *want* to believe. Much rather are they what men feel they *must* believe, whether they want to or no. "Men hate and despise religion", as we read in Pascal's *Pensées*, "but they are afraid it may be true". And no theory of religion can hope to stand that does not take full account of this plain element of obligation which it invariably contains... If all that Feuerbach and Freud say were true, we should expect to find in historical religion a glorification of self-seeking instead of what we do find — the most rigorous self-denial and self-sacrifice and the belief in a God Who demands of men things almost impossible to perform... If the verities of religion represent no more than our private likes and dislikes, then clearly there is no need to trouble our heads any further about them. But if they should turn out to be related not to our wishes and our whims but to our duties and obligations, then it is by no means so certain that they are to be thus lightly dismissed as mere subjective illusions".

Thus we come to the second question. To what, we may rightly ask of those who challenge Christianity in the name of psychology, are we to attribute the nature and origin of the compulsion which constrains us to project our subjective desires and fears on to a God of our imagination? To ask this is not to suggest that in calling attention to the mechanism

of projection psychologists have not brought to our notice an essential fact of human nature. But the experience of many medical analysts indicates that the more their patients are freed from the results of the processes of pathological projection, the stronger their faith often becomes that their Christian experience is both real and essential, and all the more so when freed from much that, in a phrase of Dr. Brown's, "was merely infantile and supported by sentimental associations or historical accidents". It is just at this point that we come face to face with what may, in all reverence, be described as the challenge of Jesus Christ to psychology. If the experiences He claimed were merely subjective, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that they were pathological; and if pathological, that they were so in very marked degree. But how can such a theory account for such sanity and wholeness of life as were His, and have since become in increasing measure the achievement of those who accept His invitation to share those experiences with Him?

It is along some such lines as these that the challenge of modern psychology to the central message of Christianity in regard to the possibility and actuality of intimate personal relationships between men and God may confidently be faced. But it would be wrong to conclude even such a brief treatment of the subject without the recognition that "the psychologist has every right to investigate the degree to which a man's religious views conform to his general psychological make-up; the manner, for instance, in which these views serve to defend him from the uncongenial; the way in which they compensate for feelings of inferiority; the extent to which they provide a feeling of security from the menacing realities of life"; that *the attack of modern psychology upon Christianity is largely directed against those aspects of it which are second rate and extrinsic*; and that "the defence of Christianity will be successful only in so far as its champions join hands with the psychologists in a ruthless condemnation of all but the vital core of dynamic idealism which may confidently be expected to resist everything except "the will to disbelieve". When one contemplates

the discrepancies between current Christian practice on the one hand and the gospel of the Cross on the other, it is easy to see why the psychologist attacks the former in preference to the latter." (Dr. Crichton Miller, "The New Psychology and the Preacher". *Italics mine.*) Christianity has nothing to fear and everything to gain from any challenge to reality, and its advocates should welcome rather than regret the timely and healthy stimulation of this kind with which they are now confronted by psychology.

The Liberation of the Soul

FRITZ KÜNKEL

1. *The Situation in the Light of Experience*

The new psychology, or, to use a more recent and better word, the new characterology, owes most of its progress to medical science. We need only to mention the names of Sigmund Freud, Carl Georg Jung and Alfred Adler to make this clear. All medical science however is concerned with the healing of illnesses. This new characterology therefore, is different from the academic psychology in that it is above all interested in practical results. It does not simply make statements about the how of things, but it tries to help and to teach. Thus it comes unwittingly into the immediate neighbourhood of another practical psychological activity which has already existed for many centuries, namely, what has been called by the churches, the "cure of souls". It seems that we have now come to the time when these two activities can not only help and support each other, but can also be fused into one system based on scientific principles.

Before we go deeper into this important development we should indicate what psycho-therapy means today. Our examples will show that psycho-therapy is closely related to the "cure of souls" and nevertheless soundly scientific. Neither case concerns people whom we would call "sick" in the ordinary sense of the word, but rather difficult or

perhaps "derailed" characters. We find hundreds of such characters around us and they all need sympathetic help, but unfortunately most of them shrug their shoulders at the mere idea of such interference.

The first case is one of a student of languages, Heinrich A., twenty six years of age, gifted, interested in many activities and well known in the university as an all-round fellow. Before his final examination he suddenly desires to change the whole plan of his life. He wants to become a business man. He opens negotiations about the hire of a restaurant, then plans the opening of a dancing school or an advertising institution, spends his last penny on these things and finally pretends that he has missed his calling because of the variety of his gifts and is now forced to shoot himself.

The second case is also a philologist, Gustav B. twenty eight years of age with a somewhat one-sided gift for languages and literature. He is an industrious and even pedantic worker who does not allow himself any enjoyment, who goes to his examination with a tremendous amount of knowledge and then fails three times in succession. The Ministry of Education tries to save him, but he declares that he is no good for intellectual activities and that it would be better for him to accept a modest place as a clerk or as a postman.

Our first impression would be that these two students, because of their absolutely different characters, have met with absolutely different difficulties. We should not believe a psycho-therapist who told us that both were suffering from the same trouble. But we will understand this last statement when we begin to study the history of the development of these two characters.

The first, Heinrich A. is the eldest son of a wealthy father. He has two younger sisters. His father died when he was four years of age. Until that moment he seems to have been brought up quite reasonably except that his childish accomplishments were too much admired. His earliest memory is of balancing himself on a high fence and his father saying to his mother "this boy will certainly be a mountain climber". This idea of mountain climbing becomes the

primary motive of his further development. After the death of his father Heinrich grows up among women only. His mother and sisters, and an aunt, who live in the same family, anxiously protect the only male descendent of the family. They spoil him and suggest to him that he is called to outstanding accomplishments.

When he goes to school his character is already determined. It could be described in the bare terms of the principles of a constitution : Paragraph one : " I will become a mountain climber ; only the highest accomplishment is good enough for me. " Paragraph two : " I should not bother about details. The smaller things are subordinate to my will. " Paragraph three : " I will not be bothered with disagreeable experiences and defeats. Other people must relieve me of such distractions. "

Even if one knew nothing else about the boy beyond these three paragraphs of his psychological constitution it would be possible to predict his future life with some degree of certainty. He will begin with a great many successes and become fairly popular for he meets every new situation with an unlimited degree of self-confidence (according to paragraph one). In the long run, however, he will fail in every situation because he is not prepared to concern himself with solid work on details (according to paragraph two). On the other hand, he will never be willing to confess failure and will therefore never improve. He will rather attribute the fault to others (according to paragraph three). This situation will lead to a vicious circle which has the following character : the more difficulties he meets with in life the more dainty he will be in his attempts to avoid them. That means however that he is less and less interested in " details ", that is to say, in solid work. But the less solidly he works the more certainly defeats will come. If defeats threaten him, he will try increasingly to find some artificial means to avoid them. The last artificial means at his disposal is the effort to commit suicide.

In the case of Gustav B. the picture of his childhood is the antithesis of the one described above. His father was master of a school, a kind but very learned and very exacting indi-

vidual. The mother was altogether under his influence and did not dare to express an opinion of her own. An older brother, who died in the war, was considered a model school-boy and was always held up as an example to the younger. There were no other brothers or sisters. Gustav B. remembers from his earliest childhood that his father was always able to answer with clear and precise information, any question put to him. The desire to be like the father became, of course, the centre of the child's character. But this meant that one should know everything and never fail in answering a question. On the other hand the father was always pointing out to the boy that he was unable to do things as well and as successfully as the older brother. The constitution of his character at the time of his going to school was therefore characterised by the following paragraphs : Paragraph one : " I will become like my father. The only type of life with which I can be satisfied is to know everything and never to fail in anything. " Paragraph two : " I can therefore never give an answer except after having prepared myself most carefully and with the assurance that the result will not be a failure. " Paragraph three : " Since I can never be absolutely certain that I have prepared myself sufficiently I must never run the risk of an examination. "

Again we can predict the future life of the boy from the paragraphs of this constitution. It is interesting to note that they determined also his behaviour toward other people and toward the other sex. The contact with girls meant the same to him as the contact with professors. In both cases the question came up — " Shall I pass the examination and what mark will he or she give me ? " For that reason he was compelled endlessly to continue his preparations in every realm of life.

The vicious circle which resulted from this attitude was the following — " the more I have prepared myself the more I shall suffer if defeat comes. The more I fear defeat the more I must prepare myself and the more I prepare myself the more fear I have of defeat. "

The incapacity to live a normal life revealed itself in both cases in the matter of examinations because in Germany

examinations are the most obvious test of character. It is, however, self-evident that there was an incapacity to stand the test in other realms as well. It was an "examination-neurosis". For every decision in life, every professional activity, every meeting with important personalities, and above all, marriage came to be considered as an examination.

If we try to discover what is the common element in both characters we find that both "constitutions" go back to the same principle. This principle is — "under all circumstances I must be victorious in the struggle for existence. For me defeat would mean total ruin." If we add that the forms, which the ideas of victory and defeat have assumed in both cases, have originated from practically accidental fixations (the mountain climber and the school master), we understand that the aim of both character-systems is finally to make the "ego" victorious. Both live under the constant threat — "If I cannot be victorious I do not want to live". Both try to dictate their own egocentric law to the universe. This egocentric claim that the world should fit in with the paragraphs of our own inner constitution means that one makes oneself the lawgiver of the whole world. That is, one wants to put one's "old Adam" in the place of God.

That the theoretical conclusion corresponds to the reality of life becomes clear as soon as the egocentric character concerned happens to meet a situation in which he cannot enforce his egocentric system. Life is such that we grow through suffering and defeat. And life is such that egocentricity with its vicious circle results automatically in even greater trouble. The paragraphs which one has worked out unconsciously in order to lead the ego to victory make it impossible to gain real victory. They produce the very thing which they were meant to avoid, that is to say, defeat.

Heinrich A. always avoided critical situations because he wanted to come out on top. He was thus in danger of becoming an eternal student while his contemporaries were entering various professions. The more he wanted to come out on top the more surely he fell to the bottom.

Gustav B.'s desire was never to give a wrong answer and therefore he did not give any answer. And the more he

struggled to win the reputation of a scholar who never makes a mistake the more he created the suspicion that he did not know anything. His "ego at the top" resulted necessarily in "ego at the bottom". But since this last result had to be avoided at all costs it came finally to what we call the characterological crisis and what medical science calls the nervous breakdown. It is the over-throw of the inner constitution.

The "ego" for the sake of which the paragraphs of character had been worked out must recognise its bankruptcy. It resigns. Those who identify the "ego" with life itself will then come to suicide. Those, however, who live more deeply will find out that this "ego" is not the same as life. It is possible to give up one's "ego" and not to die. This leads to the wonderful discovery that life under the government of the monarch "ego" was not real life at all.

The crisis, which takes place in every human life at one time or another can again lead to derailment. The old egocentric tendency may turn up in some new form. Some so-called leader, some philosopher, some politician, some religious crank, may become the object of adoration just as the "ego" was unconsciously adored before. If that happens nothing has been gained. In order to avoid this result of the crisis there is need of a helper who understands these dangers. Formerly, those who were active in the "cure of souls" possessed this knowledge. Today, one finds it rather more perhaps among the psycho-therapists. Let us hope that tomorrow it will be in the hands of men and women for whom psycho-therapy and the "cure of souls" means one and the same thing.

It is self-evident that the empty throne, from which the "ego" has been chased at the time of inner crisis, must find a new occupant. Man needs some final direction for his inner life. The man in trouble tends to put his helper on the throne. The psycho-therapist must take great care not to occupy that position himself. This task of avoiding "adoration" by one's patients can only be accomplished by a psycho-therapist who is not subject to the law of his own "ego". The only man who can help is the man who has been helped himself. At this point however, our psycholo-

gical problem becomes a philosophical or perhaps a religious one. All therapy has been started at some time by some one and all who have been helped by that man directly or indirectly have a tendency to adore him. Those who know the "communities" around Freud, Jung and Adler know what this may lead to. To whom then must we go back for our starting point in psycho-therapy in order that we may transcend the purely human? This question can only be answered by the religious insight of each individual.

The activity of the therapist is not so much of a productive as of a directive character just as the doctor directs the development of an illness, but does not create health. It has therefore two aspects. The first is negative. It does not aim at saving the "ego". If Heinrich A. had been helped by certain artificial tricks to pass his examination well he would not really have been helped. And if Gustav B. had been taught to display all his accumulated knowledge to its best advantage his further inner development would still have been hindered. Neither sports nor electricity nor suggestion can really help. The only thing which can help is that event which leads us to the second aspect of the therapeutic activity. It is the event which makes man truly productive because he gives up the safe-guarding of his "ego". His accomplishments increase when he does not live for himself or for one other person, but for all. Life is only productive when one serves humanity instead of putting humanity at one's own service. This event takes place, first of all, in the relation between the therapist and his patient. The latter tries always to put the therapist at his service (before the crisis) and then secondly, to put himself at the service of the therapist (during the crisis). He must come to understand that both therapist and patient must put themselves at the service of a supra-personal organism (after the crisis). It is, however, not enough to give to the patient a rational insight into these things. He must experience them directly. He will resist with all the forces which are at the disposal of the "old Adam" and the words or the logic of the therapist cannot show him the way out. It is only the kindness and the unmistakable

sincerity of the therapist which are effective. But these must be based on a fundamentally religious attitude. Psychotherapy without religion must go wrong.

II. *The Situation in the Light of Science*

If we compare the situation of science today with that of about the year 1900 we find two characteristic differences. The first is the convergence of the various sciences. Formerly every specialist worked in his own realm without much concern for science as a whole, but today every scientist feels that progress is impossible if he does not try to subordinate himself to the whole of science. This is not only true of individuals, but also of the various branches of science. The sociologist cannot get on without the psychologist, the psychologist cannot get on without the physiologist and, all together they are seeking a comprehensive discipline.

Formerly, this comprehensive system was looked for in a so-called science of sciences and it was claimed that philosophy should accomplish this task. Today, however, we know that even the most comprehensive science which tries to coordinate all the others must be empirical in character. Philosophy with its empty abstractions cannot meet this need. For we need that type of final insight which arises from the experience of all other sciences, but which at the same time can be applied concretely and immediately to practical life. It is however a question whether and how far such final insight can itself be purely scientific in character. The need for a concrete and practical summary of all our experience of life has still to be met.

The second characteristic of the present situation is the bankruptcy of the causal method which speaks of science only in terms of verifiable results of verifiable causes. At the beginning of our century scientists were convinced that all experiences, including the psychical ones, could be explained scientifically and that the totality of reality was purely causally determined. The present and the future were totally and unchangeably fixed by the past. Otherwise

they said, science would not be possible. This conception has been revolutionised. We may refer to the biological studies of Hans Druiesch, who shows convincingly that life is not causally determined. Moreover, the experience of psycho-therapy has led us from the entirely deterministic conception of the psycho-analytic theory of Freud to the intermediate conception of C. G. Jung and then to the entirely indeterministic individual psychology of Alfred Adler. We know now that life consists of free creative activities which will never be explained by the relationships of cause and effect. Instead of the causal relation of cause and effect we use now the teleological relation between means and end. We do not ask : "What is the cause of a headache or of an outburst of passion", but rather, "what is the purpose of these phenomena in human life". In this way we arrive at the characterological insight of which we spoke in the first part of this article.

But the question as to the real significance of the relations between cause and effect remains. Everyone knows that such relations exist both in the realm of life and in the realm of matter. One might, for instance, mention the example of the effects of alcoholism. But how are these causal connections related to the teleological ones ?

We are thus confronted with two fundamental problems in present-day science. The first is to find a unified system of all sciences which we can use in our practical work, and the second is to discover the relation between the causal or "deterministic" connection of cause and effect and the teleological "indeterministic" connection of means and end. The answer to these two problems does not come from any special science, neither from philosophy, nor from the intuition of some scientific genius. The answer has already been given. It is as if it had waited for the day when humanity was at last ready to come to an exact formulation of its questions. The answer is to be found in the New Testament.

We are not here concerned with theological questions or with dogmatic problems or purely religious matters. We are concerned with questions of science. Is *this* answer really scientific or is it "only religious" ? Let us first give

it a clear formulation in relation to the question of determinism and indeterminism.

Science is convinced that in the realm of dead matter (the object) causality and, therefore, the determination of the future by the past, can be proved satisfactorily. In the realm of the dead the "dead law" reigns. Science has also found out that in the realm of life and, particularly, in the realm of human behaviour, the teleological indeterministic relation of means and end is decisive. And since every end serves the next higher end the final end can never be determined and never be reached. From the standpoint of the end the choice of the means is a free choice and where the means fail new means are produced. In the realm of life therefore productivity and freedom reign.

Man is undoubtedly alive and therefore free. He can always produce new means. But he is also determined by the conditions of his environment, by his body, by his habits and capacities. He is thus at the same time a child of life and a child of death. What then is the relation between death and life in humanity ?

We know from the results of psycho-therapy that human behaviour becomes increasingly "dead", "fixed", in short causally determined, when man tries anxiously to protect his actual situation, that is his "ego" from any change. And we know also that man becomes increasingly productive and increasingly free if he can get rid of that anxiety about the "changes" of the "ego", if he has confidence in life and if he accepts his tasks and responsibilities with courage. If we try to formulate this psychological truth we must say whosoever tries to conserve his "ego" becomes rigid and loses his vitality. He loses the very thing which he has tried to conserve. Whosoever risks his "ego" loses rigidity and gains vitality. He receives something which is more than his "ego" namely life. It is clear that this principle has been formulated much more strikingly in the words — "For whosoever will save his life shall lose it : and whosoever will lose his life shall find it."

In this way the central thought of Christianity comes to occupy the central place in the system of sciences. And

this does not happen because of the religious desires of the scientists, but simply because science discovers an answer to its questions which is identical with the answer of Christianity.

It is self-evident that even if we find further points of contact between Christianity and characterology we shall not want to give up the autonomy of either. Characterology may not let itself be hampered by the fear of contradicting the statements of Christianity as was the case in medieval science, and similarly theology should not consider it a hindrance in its work if there is a temporary contradiction between it and the scientific convictions of the moment. Such contradictions must be accepted as problems and tasks the solution of which may be expected from further research and study. Formerly, the idea of *credo quia absurdum* put an end to all research, but today the contradictions between the various realms of science stimulate us to new discovery.

One of the most difficult problems which does not only play a rôle in characterology, but also in the science of biology, the problem of freedom and determination, has thus found a solution which corresponds closely to the Christian conviction. This insight leads to conclusions in the realms of psychiatry and pedagogy, law and cultural policy. And these conclusions must be in harmony with the practical work of Christianity if the Christian and the characterological approaches apply their principles consistently. Psychotherapy must become a part of the general "cure of souls" or it will fail. And all "cure of souls" will fail if it does not work in harmony with psycho-therapy. And the same is true of the science which we may call the psycho-therapy of the nations, the cultural policy, the navigation of the history of mankind. Instead of the philosophy of which Karl Marx said "that it only interprets the world" we need a Christian cultural policy which has the task to "change the world". If we ask what might be the central notion of such a science I would give the following answer: Humanity cannot be led to happiness along the straight road of technical progress and political measurements. The ideal of

a straight line to the summit of Olympus has proved to be a chimera. The road upward goes through the depths, through suffering, despair, through crisis and change. Between the thesis and the synthesis we must inevitably pass through the antithesis. No individual can be freed from his egocentricity unless he denies himself. Every class, every nation and finally humanity as a whole must break down before it comes to its senses. To that end the "ego" (subjectum minus) must subordinate itself in order that the "it" (subjectum majus) can become sovereign. The subjectum minus is the "old Adam", the subjectum majus is God.

Human life is so organised that only those who accept this truth are able to stand the test of suffering. All men, all classes or nations, which are not willing to live according to this principle come eventually to ruin, unless perhaps, in the last moment, they give up their egocentric aims.

Résumé

La nouvelle psychologie, disons la nouvelle « caractérologie », doit ses progrès à la médecine et, comme elle, s'intéresse avant tout aux résultats pratiques, cherchant à guérir, à instruire, ce qui la rapproche de la cure d'âme. Celle-ci et la nouvelle psychologie doivent fusionner en un seul système à base scientifique.

Qu'est-ce que la psychologie d'aujourd'hui ? Pas plus que la cure d'âme elle n'a affaire à des malades, au sens ordinaire du mot, plutôt à des caractères difficiles ou dévoyés. Prenons deux exemples : Heinrich A., étudiant, bien doué, apprécié à l'université, change brusquement d'orientation avant son examen final, se lance dans les affaires, se ruine, accuse du désastre la variété de ses dons et finit par se suicider. Gustav B., étudiant travailleur, se prépare à fond pour ses examens, échoue trois fois de suite et refuse l'aide qu'on lui offre, en disant que le travail intellectuel ne lui convient pas. Au premier abord on ne voit pas de rapport entre ces deux cas.

Heinrich est le fils aîné d'une famille riche. On l'admire : en le voyant se balancer sur une haute barrière, son père dit de lui : « Ce sera un alpiniste. » C'est son premier souvenir. L'enfant a quatre ans quand son père meurt. La mère, les sœurs, une tante couvent anxieusement le seul « homme » de la famille et le gâtent. Quand il arrive à

l'école, son caractère pourrait se résumer en trois points : Je serai alpiniste, seuls les talents les plus relevés sont dignes de moi. Je ne dois pas me préoccuper des détails. Je ne veux pas d'expériences désagréables et d'échecs ; c'est aux autres de m'en débarrasser. Voilà qui suffirait à prédire l'avenir de ce jeune homme. Pour commencer il aura quelques succès dus à son assurance (premier point). Mais à la longue il est destiné à échouer en tout, faute de se mettre sérieusement au travail en tenant compte des détails (deuxième point). D'autre part refusant d'admettre l'échec et mettant la faute sur les autres (troisième point), il sera incapable de progrès. C'est le cercle vicieux. Plus il rencontre de difficultés et plus il se dérobe. Or moins il travaille et plus il échoue. Le dernier moyen dont il dispose pour se dérober, c'est le suicide.

L'enfance de Gustav B. présente un contraste parfait. Le père, directeur d'école, est très instruit et exigeant ; la mère très effacée. Un frère aîné, mort à la guerre, est toujours présenté, au plus jeune, comme un modèle qu'il n'arrive pas à suivre. Gustav remarque que son père est capable de répondre avec exactitude à toute question qui lui est posée et le désir de lui ressembler détermine le caractère de l'enfant : tout savoir, ne jamais être en peine de répondre. Quand il atteint l'âge scolaire, son caractère peut se résumer en trois points : Je veux être comme mon père, tout savoir, ne jamais échouer. Je ne peux pas répondre sans m'être très soigneusement préparé. Mais ne pouvant être certain d'être suffisamment prêt, je ne dois jamais courir le risque de me présenter à un examen. Ici encore il est facile de prévoir l'avenir. Même l'attitude de Gustav vis-à-vis de la femme est déterminée par ce qui précède : il a toujours peur de n'être pas assez prêt. Le cercle vicieux est ici : Plus je me prépare, plus je souffrirai si j'échoue ; plus j'ai peur de l'échec, plus je dois me préparer.

L'inaptitude à vivre une vie normale se manifeste, dans les deux cas, quand les examens mettent le caractère à l'épreuve. L'élément commun aux deux cas peut se formuler ainsi : « En toutes circonstances, il faut que j'aie le dessus. Pour moi, un échec équivaut à une catastrophe ». Ce sont des fixations accidentelles (l'alpiniste et le maître d'école) qui donnent leurs formes particulières aux notions de victoire et de défaite, mais le but est le même dans les deux cas : la victoire du moi, sans laquelle la vie n'est pas considérée comme valant la peine d'être vécue. C'est l'égoïsme du « vieil Adam » qui se met à la place de Dieu. Or c'est par la souffrance et l'échec que l'homme progresse et l'égoïsme provoque infailliblement ce qu'il s'efforce d'empêcher. Dans le désir de réussir, Heinrich élude les situations critiques et reste éternellement étudiant, tandis que ses

camarades entrent dans la carrière. Dans la crainte de se tromper, Gustav s'abstient. L'envie d'atteindre le premier rang les rejette au dernier et aboutit chez eux à la crise de caracrière, et aux troubles nerveux. Le moi, est, en effet, obligé de s'avouer vaincu et ceux pour lesquels le moi équivalait à la vie elle-même en viennent alors au suicide.

Sur ce genre de crise peut s'en greffer une autre, si un mauvais guide se substitue au moi et devient à son tour objet d'adoration. Ceux qui se consacraient autrefois à la cure d'âme connaissaient bien ce danger ; aujourd'hui ce sont plutôt les psychiatres. Espérons que demain cette science sera pratiquée par des hommes et des femmes pour lesquels la psychothérapie et la cure d'âme seront une seule et même chose. Il faut que le trône d'où une crise intérieure a chassé le moi, soit occupé par quelqu'un d'autre ; il faut un pouvoir suprême et l'être en crise est tenté de donner ce pouvoir à celui qui l'a aidé. Seul le psychiatre détaché de lui-même peut éviter ce danger. Ceux-là peuvent aider qui ont été aidés eux-mêmes et c'est ici que le problème de psychologie devient philosophique ou peut-être religieux. A qui aller pour dépasser ce qui est purement humain ? C'est à l'intuition religieuse de chacun de répondre. Pour le thérapeute il s'agit moins de créer que de guider. On n'aurait pas aidé Heinrich en réussissant à lui faire passer son examen, ni Gustav en obtenant qu'il mit en valeur ses connaissances accumulées. Ce qu'il faut c'est que le moi renonce à se protéger, pour que la vie devienne féconde, que l'homme ne vive ni pour lui-même, ni pour un autre être, mais pour tous. Après avoir essayé de mettre le thérapeute à son service, le malade essaye de se mettre lui-même au service du thérapeute ; il doit arriver à comprendre que tous deux sont au service de quelque chose de plus grand et à en faire personnellement l'expérience. Ici tout dépend de la vie religieuse du thérapeute. Sans religion la psychothérapie est vouée à l'échec.

Nous assistons actuellement à un mouvement de convergence dans le domaine scientifique. Il nous faut une intuition qui, tout en se fondant sur toutes les sciences s'applique à la vie pratique. De même, au début de ce siècle, le déterminisme prétendait tout expliquer, même les phénomènes psychiques. Aujourd'hui la psychothérapie nous a conduits du déterminisme psychanalytique de Freud à la psychologie individuelle non-déterministe d'Alfred Adler. Nous savons que les libres activités créatrices de la vie ne peuvent être expliquées par aucune relation de cause à effet ; nous y substituons les relations téléologiques de moyens et de fins et nous arrivons ainsi à l'intuition « caractérologique » dont nous parlions en commençant. Les relations de cause à effet n'en demeurent pas moins et il s'agit de

saisir le rapport qui existe entre elles et les relations téléologiques. La réponse aux deux problèmes à résoudre : système synthétique de toutes les sciences, applicable à la vie pratique ; rapport entre les relations causales déterminées et les relations téléologiques non-déterminées se trouve déjà dans le *Nouveau Testament*. Cette réponse est-elle *scientifique* ou « seulement religieuse » ?

Dans le domaine de la matière morte, la science croit pouvoir prouver le bien fondé du déterminisme. Dans le domaine de la vie, de la conduite, c'est la relation téléologique non-déterminée qui est décisive ; du point de vue de la fin, le choix des moyens est libre. L'homme est libre, parce que vivant, mais il est aussi déterminé par son entourage, son corps etc. Il est donc en même temps un enfant de la vie et de la mort, mais cela dans quelle mesure ? La psychothérapie nous enseigne que le comportement « se fixe » et « meurt » dans la mesure où l'homme cherche à protéger son moi contre tout changement, au lieu d'oser vivre et de prendre courageusement ses responsabilités. « Qui veut sauver sa vie la perdra ». C'est ainsi que la solution des problèmes posés par la science rejoint la solution chrétienne. De tels points de contact entre le christianisme et la « caractérologie » ne feront pas renoncer à leur autonomie respective et leurs contradictions, s'il s'en produit, doivent seulement stimuler de nouvelles recherches. La psychothérapie et la cure d'âme ne peuvent pas se passer l'une de l'autre. Ce qu'il nous faut ce n'est pas une philosophie chargée « d'interpréter le monde », mais un moyen de changer « le monde ». Le progrès humain ne peut se faire en ligne droite ascendante ; le chemin qui monte passe par des abîmes de souffrance. Hommes, classes, nations et l'humanité elle-même, tout doit subir la loi du renoncement, de la subordination du moi à Dieu.

Ist der Glaube lediglich ein psychologisches Phänomen ?

Ph. KOHNSTAMM

Die Redaktion dieser Zeitschrift hat mich gebeten, meine Meinung zu sagen über die Frage, die an der Spitze dieser Zeilen steht. Aber jede Frage fordert, um eine eindeutige Lösung zuzulassen, dass sie nicht betrachtet wird als auf sich selbst gestellt, sondern als Glied einer Problematik ; nur so

bekommt sie einen verständlichen Sinn. Wir müssen uns also zu allererst fragen, welche Deutungen unsere Frage zulässt.

Kommt man her von den metaphysischen Voraussetzungen, die die Wissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts und speziell ihre Psychologie beherrscht haben, so wird man beim Lesen vielleicht den Nachdruck legen auf das Adjektiv : Ist der Glaube lediglich ein *psychologisches* Phänomen ? Also : hat er überhaupt Einfluss auf das physische Geschehen ? Und schon rollt sich die ganze Wunderfrage, und im ontologischen Sinne noch weiter, die Frage vom Parallelismus und der Wechselwirkung auf. Es liegt nicht in meiner Absicht, hier auf diese Seite der Problemstellung breiter einzugehen. Nur kurz möchte ich folgendes sagen. Die gesamte neuere Psychologie, ob man denkt an Behaviourismus, Personalismus, Strukturpsychologie oder „verstehende“ Psychologie hat im Prinzip, wenn auch nicht immer in einsichtiger Erfüllung, diese ganze Art, das Problem zu fassen, überwunden. Die Welt lässt sich nicht zerspalten in eine psychische und eine physische Hälfte. Jeder Akt und jede Disposition ist im Stern'schen Sinne psycho-physisch neutral ; und je zentraler ein Geschehen innerhalb der Person, umso gewisser hat es auch in der objektiv erfassbaren Welt seine Folgen. Das Wort von dem Glauben, der Berge versetzen kann, scheitert nicht prinzipiell an einer Naturunmöglichkeit, sondern an unserer Schwäche ; nicht über prinzipielle Möglichkeiten : die Ob-Frage, sondern über die Wie-Frage und die Grenzen, d.h. die Wieweit-Frage kann die Wissenschaft sich im „normalen“¹ Falle ein Urteil bilden.

Aber man kann die Frage auch lesen mit dem Nachdruck auf *Phänomen*, und auf diese Weise ergibt sich eine zwiefache Deutung. Demjenigen, der vertraut ist mit phänomenologischer Forschung, lässt sich die erste Deutung in wenigen Worten erläutern : Bezieht der Glaube sich auf einen intentionalen Gegenstand, oder ist er ein intentionsloses Phänomen, wie z.B. eine Schmerzempfindung oder ein Organgefühl ? Für die meisten Leser werde ich den Unterschied

¹ Dieses Wort schliesst selbst wieder ein Problem ein.

durch eine Analogie näher begründen müssen. Das physikalisch-chemische Geschehen, welches wir als Natur auffassen, ein bestimmtes Gewitter z.B., oder das Nordlicht eines bestimmten Tages, oder der Lauf des Mondes um die Erde hat schlichtes *Dasein*, aber es bezieht sich nicht auf etwas, es weist — jedenfalls nach herrschender Meinung — nicht hin auf etwas anderes, welches es *repräsentiert* ; es zeigt nur, wenn man will, auf etwas hin, wovon es Grund oder Folge ist. Aber ein Wegweiser im Gebirge, oder die elektrischen Wellen des Umrufes, vielleicht auch die „ Kanäle “ auf dem Mars, jedenfalls unsere Wasser- und Eisenstrassen stehen noch in einer anderen als der rein kausalen Verknüpfung. Sie haben eine Bedeutung, d.h. weisen hin auf einen Willens- und Zweckzusammenhang, mit dem sie verknüpft sind, und ihr „ Wesen “ entzieht sich dem, der diesen Zusammenhang nicht „ versteht “. Das gilt natürlich auch und ganz prägnant von dem Papier dieser Seite und der Tinte, mit der es bedruckt ist.

Von jeder tiefer dringenden Unterscheidung in diesem Rahmen absehend, wenden wir uns nun sofort der Formulierung zu : Hat das Glaubensphänomen lediglich Dasein, oder weist es hin auf „ etwas “, bezieht es sich auf einen Gegenstand, der „ ausserhalb “ des Phänomens liegt ? Auf diese präzisierte Problemstellung nun muss meiner Meinung nach unzweifelhaft mit „ ja “ geantwortet werden, eben weil die Rede ist von dem „ Glaubens “-Phänomen. Handelte es sich um das Phänomen der „ Religion “, so wäre diese Antwort nicht so unbedingt gewiss. Wir stehen also jetzt vor der Frage : Was müssen wir auf dem Boden heutiger wissenschaftlicher, speziell psychologischer Forschung über das Wesen der Religion einerseits, des Glaubens andererseits behaupten. Schon diese scharfe Trennung ist erst auf Grund der Errungenschaften unseres Jahrhunderts möglich. Für das neunzehnte Jahrhundert gilt noch, dass es beide Begriffe ineinanderfliessen liess. Typisch dafür ist Schleiermachers Einstellung, der in den Reden über die Religion — wenn auch die sekundären Differenzen nicht unterschätzt werden dürfen — ziemlich denselben Gegenstand behandelt wie in „ Der christliche Glaube “. Wenn auch die noch undifferenzierte

Redeweise wiederholt Anklänge an gegenständliche Beziehungen aufweist¹, so ist doch das wesentliche des Glaubens ein rein zuständliches *Gefühl*, das fromme Selbstbewusstsein, übereinstimmend mit dem Gefühl der schlechthinnigen Abhängigkeit. Ihre jüngsten Triumphe hat diese Betrachtung gefeiert in R. Ottos Lehre von dem Numinosen, als der „eigenen Provinz“ der Religion, eine Lehre die das bewegliche Gleichgewicht des Zuständlichen und Gegenständlichen noch mehr als Schleiermacher nach der erstgenannten Seite verschiebt. Das grosse Aufsehen, welches Ottos Buch² in theologischen Kreisen machte, scheint mir nur verständlich aus der damaligen weltanschaulichen Lage. Man sah ein, mehr intuitiv als wissenschaftlich-begrifflich, dass „Religion“ ein Phänomen *sui generis* ist, d.h. wesentlich verschieden von jeder anderen Einstellung. In der Sprache der Assoziationspsychologie konnte dies aber nur so ausgedrückt werden, dass „Religion“ ein eigener elementarer Bestandteil des Seelenlebens sei. Da nun die optimistisch-freundliche Auffassung des 19. Jahrhunderts der Realität gegenüber doch nicht standhalten konnte, wirkte die Lösung „das wesentliche der Religion ist das Numinose“ wie eine Befreiung. Dass damit die Religion auf das rein animalische Niveau herabgezogen wurde, d.h. auf die Stufe der Erlebnisse, die auch Tiere besitzen, wurde nicht genügend beachtet, wobei die „evolutionistische“ Hauptthese des 19. Jahrhunderts ohne Zweifel mitgewirkt hat. Denn nach dieser kann es keine „Wesens“-Änderungen geben; wenn etwas sich aus etwas anderem entwickelt, dann sind die beiden „etwas“ qualitativ gleich. Und dass so etwas wie Furcht, Schrecken, Angst und Verwandtes mit an der Wurzel sowohl von Religion wie Glauben liegt, ist ja wohl ganz klar.

Nun liegt für die heutige Psychologie das „Wesen“ eines Phänomen nicht in den „Teilen“, in die zerfallend es gedacht werden kann, sondern in der Struktur oder Gestalt, dem „geistigen Band“. Aus diesem Gesichtspunkt heraus ist es

¹ Zweite Auflage S. 11, S. 32, u.s.w.

² Ich übersehe dabei nicht, dass an manchen Stellen im „Das Heilige“ Ansätze zu einer Ueberwindung dieses Standpunktes vorhanden sind. Aber da das Buch noch ganz gebunden ist an Terminologie und Denkweise der Assoziationspsychologie, konnten sich diese Ansätze nicht weiter entwickeln.

selbstverständlich, dass man ein "Phänomen" nur beurteilen kann nach dem, was es ist, nicht nach dem, woraus es entstanden ist. Aber diese Revolution der Psychologie hat die theologische Denkweise bis jetzt noch kaum berührt. Ganz klar tritt das hervor in der Reaktionsbewegung gegen die Schleiermacher'sche Auffassung, die "dialektische" Theologie. Ihre manchmal verwunderliche Schärfe, besonders im Anfang, ist verständlich, wenn man bedenkt, dass sie mit ungenügendem Begriffsmaterial ankämpfen muss gegen die Verwechslung von "Religion" und "Glaube" und gegen die Verschiebung des letzteren aus der gegenständlichen in die zuständige Sphäre. Es wäre eine höchst interessante Aufgabe in dieser Hinsicht Barth's Römerbrief mit seiner Dogmatik zu vergleichen, aber ich muss mir dies hier selbstverständlich versagen.

Für uns Holländer war es möglich, mit viel geringerer Leidenschaftlichkeit diesen Weg zu gehen, weil bei uns in der Theologie des 19. Jahrhunderts die Vermischung der Grenzen bei weitem nicht in dem Masse stattgefunden hat wie im Nachbarlande. Schon unsere Sprache leistete der begrifflichen Trennung Vorschub, durch die zwei Worte "godsdiens" und "religie", die — wie G. Kunze richtig erkannt hat¹ — keineswegs gleichbedeutend sind. Aber besonders Theologen wie Chantepie de la Saussaye Sr., J. H. Gunning und ihre Schule haben — obgleich ihnen das wissenschaftliche Handwerkszeug zur präzisen Erfassung damals fehlte und fehlen musste — intuitiv doch die wesentlich gegenständliche intentionale Art vom "godsdiens" (Im-Dienste-Gottes-Stehen) und damit auch von "geloof" (Glaube) niemals verleugnet.

Es würde nicht weniger als einer Einführung in die ganze neuere psychologische Forschung bedürfen, um meine Behauptung zu erhärten, dass in ihrem Lichte nur gewisse Formen von "Religion" (nicht alle) als ein schlicht zuständliches, nicht intentional—hinweisendes Phänomen betrachtet werden können, während "Glaube" *immer* einen "Gegenstand" meint, und zwar einen ganz besonderen, nicht ein Es, sondern

¹ Psychologie der Religion in Kafka Handbuch der vergl. Psychologie II, 129. Er hat aber die Art der Differenz nicht ganz richtig erfasst.

eine Person, einen Herrn. "Glauben" bedeutet in ich-DU-Relation stehen. Hier muss ich mich darauf beschränken, als stärkstes Zeugnis vielleicht zu verweisen auf K. Girgensohns monumentale Arbeit: "Der seelische Aufbau des religiösen Erlebnisses"¹. Wenn irgend eine Forschungsmethode durch ihre eigenen Tendenzen der rein zuständlichen Auffassung Vorschub zu leisten geeignet erscheint, dann ohne Zweifel die experimental-psychologische. Umso stärker spricht die Tatsache, dass der objektive Befund stärker ist als alle "methodologische Tendenz"². Gerade die scharfe Präzision dieser Arbeiten zwingt alle Vorurteile nieder, es lässt sich nicht verkennen, dass alles, was in die Sphäre des Vertrauens und der Glaubensgewissheit fällt "nicht einfach ein sinnloser und bedeutungsloser Zustand ist... sondern eine ganz bestimmte sinnvolle Anschauung mit umschliesst³." In diesem ganz präzisen Sinne ist "Glaube" jedenfalls mehr als lediglich ein Phänomen.

Hier tritt nun aber erst die letzte und tiefste, die "eigentliche" Bedeutung unserer Frage an den Tag. Für den an Husserl geschulten Leser kann ich sie ganz kurz formulieren: Was ändert sich in unserer Behandlung, wenn wir die phänomenologische Reduktion, die "Einklammerung" fallen lassen?

¹ Leipzig 1921 Hirzel.

² Natürlich soll das keineswegs besagen, dass ich mich in jeder Hinsicht an Girgensohns Resultate anschliessen könnte. Es ist aus dem obigen klar, dass ich gegen die Terminologie des "religiösen Erlebnisses" ebenso schwerwiegende Bedenken habe wie gegen seine Darstellung Schleiermachers Lehre. Auch weiter hege ich mancherlei Bedenken, aber das im Text gesagte scheint mir als Minimum unwiderleglich. Ich kann hier aber auf diese Fragen nicht weiter eingehen. Nur möchte ich noch auf folgendes Zitat von einem der hervorragendsten Schüler Girgensohns hinweisen. "Anfangs sollte G's grosses experimentelles Werk nur ein Beitrag zur religiösen Gefühlslehre und eine moderne empirische Nachprüfung der Schleiermacherschen Religionstheorie werden, wie auch aus dem Aufbau der Arbeit ersichtlich ist. Doch immer reicheren und reicheren Aufschluss gab, teils zwar ungewollt, das Material. Bald lag die herrschende Gefühlslehre der Religion zertrümmert am Boden. Ihr folgten die Reste einer voluntaristischen und intellektualistischen Religionsauffassung. Ganz unbekannte psychische Funktionen und Gestalten begannen aus der wogenden Masse neu erschlossenen seelischen Erlebens hervorzutreten. In das Zentrum der nun sich allmählich formenden neuen Religionsauffassung trat ein merkwürdiges synthetisches Gebilde, das teils aus lebendigen persönlichen Beziehungserlebnissen (Ich-Funktionen) teils aus intuitiv gedanklichen Momenten sich zusammensetzt". Werner Gruehn's Artikel Karl Girgensohn im Arch. f. d. ges. Psych. 55 s. 258.

³ 1. c. S. 496.

Für die anderen muss ich diese Ausdrücke in die Sprache des gewöhnlichen Lebens zu übersetzen versuchen. Ich hoffe verständlich zu sein, wenn ich sage, die eigentlich letzte Frage ist diese: nicht ob der Glaubende, der Vertrauende, der Betende sich an Einen *richtet*, der nicht nur alle Phänomene, ja die ganze Welt transzendiert, ob der Glaube, das Vertrauen, das Gebet Einen solchen *meint*, steht in Frage; sondern was schliesslich allein wichtig ist, ist dies, ob dieses Meinen, dieses Sich-Richten nicht ins Leere zielt, ob Einer da ist, der das Gebet hört, den Glauben schenkt, das Vertrauen ermöglicht? Was hat heutige Psychologie, oder falls diese hier nicht mehr kompetent ist, heutige Wissenschaft und Philosophie zu dieser Frage zu sagen? Nun, meines Erachtens zu allererst eine Grenzbestimmung. Streng genommen kann keine Wissenschaft, die Philosophie einbegriffen, einen konkret-existentiellen Satz begründen. Das gilt nicht nur für den "Gegenstand" der Theologie, es gilt schon für die Körperwissenschaft. Jeder wissenschaftliche Gedankengang bewegt sich in hypothetischen Urteilen; nur wer glaubt und vertraut kann kategorische Sätze bilden. Wer nicht auf irgendeiner Glaubens- und Vertrauensgrundlage fusst, kann überhaupt keinen Satz festhalten, er versinkt in den "absoluten Nihilismus" die Psychose, die Karl Jaspers so ergreifend geschildert hat.¹ Dass die Wissenschaft sich dieses Grundaxioms so oft nicht bewusst wird, findet an erster Stelle seine Erklärung darin, dass sie nur redet über Gebiete von mittlerer Lebenswichtigkeit. Niemand sucht eine exakt-"wissenschaftliche" Antwort auf die Frage, welche Ziffer die 10.10.10 Dezimalstelle in pi enthält, obgleich sie an sich lösbar ist. Aber noch viel weniger würde sich jemand begnügen mit einer "rein wissenschaftlichen" Begründung einer wirklich wichtigen Lebensentscheidung, falls dies nicht schon an sich eine *contradictio in terminis* ist, wie ich meine. Die Vertrauensgrundlage, die letzte Entscheidung, auf welcher unsere Lebenssicherheit ruht, ist nicht von uns erkämpft, sie wird uns geschenkt.

¹ Psychologie der Weltanschauungen. Kap. III, A II.

Freilich diese Grundlage hat für den einen eine ganz andere Breite wie für den andern. Während sie für viele nicht weiter reicht als bis zur Gegebenheit der Dinge, der Tiere, der Menschen — denn allem “theoretischen” Solisismus zum Trotz gibt es ja bei keinem “normalen” Menschen, der nicht innerlich überwältigt und überzeugt wäre von der Kraft dieser Gegebenheit — schauen andere Den, welchen sie als Herrn ihres Lebens erkennen, schon in seiner Knechtsgestalt. Demjenigen, für den das Bekenntnis vom Caesarea Philippi gilt, zu bestreiten, dass “dieser Jesus” wirklich sein “Herr” ist, zu versuchen, ihm das “Kurios Christos” abzudemonstrieren, ist gerade so sinnlos wie der Versuch, dem Farbensehenden zu bestreiten, dass rot nicht grün ist. Er beruft sich auf das: “Ich kann nicht anders,” und gehorcht.

Weshalb dem einen dies Schauen geschenkt wird, dem anderen nicht, das ist letztes Ur-Geheimnis, dessen Schleier nicht vor dem jüngsten Tage gelüftet wird. Ueber das *Wie* und die mitbedingenden Umstände kann die Erkenntnistheorie zusammen mit Phänomenologie und Psychologie ein wenig Licht verbreiten, denn gerade auf diesem zentralsten Gebiete ist strenge Scheidung der “Methoden” durch den Weg der Erkenntnis am wenigsten zulässig. Ich kann noch darf hier ausführlicher auf diese Dinge eingehen; nur einige ganz kurze Andeutungen seien mir noch gestattet. Im ganzen Umkreis der “Weltanschauungen” beschränkt sich dieses persönliche Erleben der ich-DU-Relation auf die Einfluss-sphäre der Bibel. Ihre Vorstufe ist das Hören der Kunde im israelitischen Prophetismus. Ihre vorläufige Erfüllung ist das Schauen des Königs, wenn auch in Knechtsgestalt, im Christentum, obgleich das landläufige Christentum vielfach noch mit anderen Strukturen durchsetzt ist. Alle “Religion” trägt phänomenologisch ein anderes Gepräge, sie ist zuständlich oder unpersönlich-gegenständlich.

Da es sich um ein “Hören”, ein “Schauen” handelt wie in der Wahrnehmung, wenn auch selbstverständlich mit anderem Gegebenheitscharakter, ist die Seele im Glauben passiv; es handelt sich nicht um ein Machen, sondern um ein Erhalten. Und doch ist die Passivität nicht absolut. Wir können uns der Einsicht widersetzen, vielleicht sogar auf die

Dauer verschliessen, wie wir Augen und Ohren schliessen und abwenden können. So wird es "verständlich" — was in neuerer methodologischer Bedeutung etwas prinzipiell anderes ist als "erklärlich" — dass die Person in der ich-DU-Relation sich nicht erdrückt, sondern im Gegenteil zu sich selbst geführt findet. Demonstrierbar, rationell erzwingbar wie eine mathematische Beweisführung — freilich auch hier nur für den sogenannten "normalen" Menschen — ist dies Hören oder Schauen niemals ; nur Hindernisse wegräumen können wir für einander ; was mehr ist, steht über menschlicher Macht. Hier liegt die prinzipielle Unmöglichkeit jeden Gottes-Beweises. Nicht weil wir Gott kennen, finden wir einen Herrn, sondern weil wir einen Herrn haben, dem wir gehorchen, wagen wir, es in seinem Namen über Gott und zu Gott zu reden. Eine impersonale Norm kann niemals das Wagnis des Theismus begründen. Aber freilich, auch im Christentum, nein gerade im Christentum, sind Glaube und Hoffnung aufs engste verknüpft. Ein "Glaubenssatz", wenn er auch wegen seines intentionalen Gehaltes nicht denkbar ist ohne gedanklichen Kern, ist kein rein theoretisches Gebilde wie ein Urteilsakt. Er ist gleichzeitig auch ein Willensentschluss und ein Ausdruck der Hoffnung. Wer hier und jetzt das volle Schauen, die volle anschauliche Erfüllung begehrt, tritt damit aus dem Rahmen des Christentums heraus. "Stückwerk ist unser Erkennen, Stückwerk unser Weissagen". Nicht bevor das Reich mit Macht hereinbricht kann unser Sehnen erfüllt werden. Das "Phänomen des Glaubens" bejahen, heisst sein Leben aufbauen auf die zwei Säulen des Gehorsams für das Diesseits und der vertrauenden Zuversicht auf ein Jenseits. Nur wer gehorsam-vertrauend wartet, kennt das Leben dessen, der "es wagt mit Gott".

The Challenge of Psychology to Christianity

Harrison S. ELLIOTT

Many Christians seem to consider psychology a threat rather than a challenge to Christianity. The term "behaviourist" arouses as much emotion today in many Christian circles in the United States as "higher critic" did thirty years ago. The parallels between the two situations are interesting. Historical criticism of the Bible involves the application of historical method to the study of the sacred records. Psychology seeks to apply scientific method to the study of personality to determine what it is like and how it develops. It is true that not all psychologists confine themselves to this function, but at times use their psychology in an attempt to verify their own philosophical interpretations of their data. Indeed a great deal of the psychology of religion is theology with the label changed. Psychology as such is not concerned with criticising conduct or with appraising personality. Its function is to understand personality.

Psychology is irritating to many Christians, just as was historical criticism, because it proposes to apply scientific method to what Christians consider sacred realms — human personality, character development, and Christian experience. Particularly is it irritating to them when psychologists seek to examine the assumptions regarding the development and transformation of personality on which the Christian religion has built its beliefs. The development of a psychological science involved this examination just as the development of natural science has resulted in the examination of the assumptions of religion regarding the development of the universe.

It is not possible to assume agreement in the conclusions of various psychologists regarding human personality any more than it is possible to find among historical critics agreement as to authorship and historicity of the Bible records. Since the science of psychology is young, there are only a few conclusions as yet tested by enough experimentation to give them reliability, and even these are subject,

as in all sciences, to the revision of further research. But the challenge of psychology to Christians is that they be willing to have their assumptions and processes examined, and indeed that they not only be willing, but that they join wholeheartedly with psychologists in their efforts to check whether or not the assumptions which Christians have made regarding human personality are true, and whether the methods they have proposed for the transformation of human life are effective. It is not surprising that this challenge has aroused fear and meets with opposition, because a willingness to have the psychological basis of one's beliefs and one's methods examined requires maturity, just as it required maturity to be willing to have the basis of one's belief and one's method regarding the Bible examined.

What is involved may be made more clear by pointing out a few of the places at which psychology is a challenge to Christianity. The Christian scheme of salvation has assumed that an individual is not able to develop goodness except as his original nature is changed and that in Christian conversion this human nature is transformed and the individual becomes indeed a new creature. The results of psychological research seem to be pointing toward the conclusion that the native equipment, with which one is endowed, is neither good nor bad, but has possibilities of either or both, and that attitudes and habits develop gradually in the specific experiences of the individual and are gradually changed. Along with this, there is increasing evidence to confirm the confidence of Jesus and of the Christian movement in the possibilities of development and of modifiability in human nature. Indeed a great deal of religious education has already accepted the challenge of psychology regarding human nature and is building its programmes upon it.

Bad conduct for Christians has been considered sin, and they have sought to secure repentance. Sickness also for many centuries was so considered. "Who did sin", says the Bible record, "this man or his parents that he was born blind"? Modern medical science has challenged the former assumptions of the Christian religion regarding the sources of disease, and most Christians now recognise that good or ill

health is due to causes in the individual's inheritance and environment, in part at least beyond his control. Many psychologists are now challenging the assumption of Christians regarding bad conduct, and the more recent efforts for the elimination of delinquency and the transformation of personality have assumed that bad conduct is sickness rather than sin. It is a symptom of personality's ill health and demands the same sort of thorough-going attack upon the causes as medical science is bringing to the prevention and cure of disease.

A third and related challenge comes in the assumptions regarding individual conduct in its relation to the social environment. Until recently the greater part of the attention of the Christian religion was given to saving individuals and to developing in them a type of character with which they could resist the world and be prepared for a future life. If, as psychological research seems to indicate, individuals develop their characteristics in social experience, this raises the question as to whether individual Christian character can be successfully developed except as corresponding changes in the social order take place. Certain objections to group methods in religious education seem to assume that religious educators put people into groups in order to give them the fun of thinking together rather than of thinking alone. But the fundamental fact is that we live very largely in group relations and we cannot be individualists even as much as in former times when each family, or at least each small group, was more nearly self-sufficient. We are now in spite of ourselves involved in groups small and large — family, social, business, racial, national. The customs and practices of the group bring pressure to bear upon the individuals. Even the stronger, who seem to have become independent of the group *mores*, deceive themselves as to the extent to which they are free, because while they may change their individual attitudes, they still are inevitably party to organised group discriminations and un-Christian practices. This would strengthen the emphasis upon a social gospel. Social psychology raises the question as to whether the individual in a group is not in an impossible position, unless the Christian

religion is willing to do something about the group *mores* and practices, and is able to develop a new quality of life within these various groups. Group discussion has developed as a method of enabling members of groups to recognise their fundamental differences and to work out more Christian practices in the corporate life of which they are necessarily a part.

A fourth area of research is in the relation of the Christian religion to healing. This is an area in which it is not sufficient to establish that a cure occurred. Many cures which seem miraculous are taking place both within and outside of Christian auspices. But there must be willingness to have these cures examined, in the light of the larger knowledge of functional and organic disorders and of the relation of the emotions to health, to discover whether these results are due to a contravention of law or whether in such cures individuals stumble upon the psychological conditions of cure which if understood could be more widely and effectively applied.

A fifth realm involves the examination of Christian experience itself. Many Christians resent what they consider the presumption, if not the sacrilege, of psychologists in attempting to discover what is actually taking place in individual and group Christian experience. The assumption has been that if an individual had a vital Christian experience, it necessarily must be a desirable one and its validity must not be questioned ; that if people said they experienced God, or saw Christ, or received direct divine guidance through prayer, the facts they related should be accepted without question. Since we know that it is possible to hear voices, to see visions, and to have experiences with imaginary beings, with much of the vividness of the experiences of actual life, psychologists feel it is necessary to examine these religious experiences to determine what actually happened rather than to take the testimony of individuals in this realm without examination. Further, Christian experiences differ in their practical effects. Some are an escape and take people out of life, while others are an incentive to responsibility and achievement ; some tend to keep people dependent as little children and prevent their growth to maturity, while others

are a dynamic for growth and independence. Even the exaggerated conclusion that all religion is nothing but "wishful thinking" should lead Christians to examine the extent to which such a charge has some basis in fact. But it is only as we use the searching analysis of the actual circumstances and the accurate description of what takes place, growing out of a psychological study, that we are in a position to sift genuine experience from illusions or to appraise the desirability or undesirability of the experiences.

Should not the attitude of Christians, therefore, be a recognition of the contribution which the advance of psychological science is bound to make to the understanding of human personality and of Christian experience as well as to the effectiveness of the methods of Christian work? Indeed, many are finding that even the present results, preliminary and inadequate as they are, are bringing to them help in understanding personality and its transformation which have enabled them to work much more effectively. Centuries were spent invoking deity to stamp out plagues and other epidemics. It was not until through scientific research we learned the causes of these diseases and the conditions under which they could be prevented, and became really co-workers with God in the orderly processes of the universe, that these diseases were stamped out. We have been working for centuries to eliminate delinquency and crime and to transform individual character and conduct by these direct appeals to deity, and yet we have made far too slow progress. May it not be true that the concerted effort to find out the causes of misconduct and to meet the conditions under which personality is developed, will mean the elimination of delinquency and the development of a healthful individual and social life? May it not be that again we shall find that we are effective religiously as we learn the laws of God in human personality and become co-workers with Him in these areas of life?

Some Psychological Satisfactions

H.D. HILL

Any system of thought or body of science inevitably contains a point where the problem with which it has been concerned reaches a solution, where further activity along a given line ceases because the original question has received a satisfactory answer. Systems may thus be distinguished by the points at which they stop as well as by the directions in which they go : by focussing on the latter one obtains as it were the full face of a body of ideas, whereas from the former one obtains a profile. Both are unavoidable features.

As a matter of fact, however, the greater part of contemporary description of modern psychological schools neglects the profile aspect of its subject. Social science and especially psychology has been expanding so rapidly within the last fifty years that it has been chiefly discussed in its progressive phase. Its ends have almost always been treated positively as the points at which it aims, not negatively as the points beyond which it does not go.

By way of compensation for the over-emphasis on progress which is now prevalent, at any rate in America, there may possibly be a certain value in looking at some current psychological tendencies from the negative side, of noting where psychological effort ceases on the grounds that it has reached a solution ; in short, of questioning certain contemporary psychological satisfactions.

Perhaps the outstanding satisfaction of contemporary American psychology in so far as it deals with individuals is that which centres in the idea of adjustment. The adjusted individual, the individual in harmony with his environment, is the individual with whom the psychologist is satisfied, is what he tries to make out of the cases which come to him for care. The recent history of psychology makes it easy to understand why this is the case.

Modern psychology came into being in the midst of the Darwinian period. Environmental adaptation was enjoying the peak of its prestige ; science had just assumed a somewhat

grandiose attitude on what it conceived to be the apex of the ascent of man; merely to be present on such a summit was an implicit indication of fitness. The scientists looked upon the particular moment in which they were living as a climax of human progress; back of them they recognised a long line of advance, but they were disinclined to foresee similar future changes because they felt themselves to be living in the best of all possible worlds. Their idealisation of the contemporary period made them take a static attitude towards their own society at the very moment when they discovered the extent to which society is dynamic. That period was furthermore the period when the rightness of majorities was most unquestioned. Fitness consequently came to be assumed as adjustment to the cross-section of social life with which one was immediately in contact, on the terms preferred by the average man.

Such was the general atmosphere into which modern psychology was born. The problems at which the psychologist of that day went to work strengthened his tendency to be satisfied with an adjusted case. His first subjects were mostly pathological; as his work expanded the subnormal came into his field; but in any event the nature of his cases made an effort on his part to put the person at hand in tune with his responsibility, the obvious thing for him to do. Hence came the tendency to speak of all a-normal behavior as being the result of a 'flight from reality', even when that flight resulted in literature or art. A condition of normalcy, of adequate adjustment, was and is assumed as the point toward which all satisfactorily treated cases converge. Now what is this reality, this point at which the psychologist is satisfied to stop work, this adjustment after which he lets his patient go? From the very nature of his work, reality is the point at which the psychologist never is; it is the centre towards which he tries to lead back his cases along the radii of their flight; once it is near he leaves the individual with whom he has been progressing and rushes out into the field for another. If you ask him what is this centre towards which all of his work is directed, he is quite likely to reply with the details of a successful case history

and add that that is the sort of thing he means. Now an example is not a definition. Most psychologists would vigorously deny that the reality toward which they aim is the sense of the local majority at a given cross-section in time. Yet if that is not what they mean definitions are certainly in order. There are several possibilities as to what might be said. It is possible to regard psychology as a tool for effecting changes in the framework of personality, to take it purely as a means and say that the end towards which it is used must be decided in another realm, such as that of philosophy or religion. If however it is considered part of the psychologist's function that he himself should have a clear idea of an end towards which he works, attention must increasingly be given to that core of all his effort. The appearance, in very recent years, of the supernormal as a field of psychological interest is helping to show the inadequacy of the present unanalysed assumption of a reality as a contemporary average. The data there obtained raise the question of whether the "flight from reality" is always at right angles to the line of social development, whether in certain cases it does not represent a flight *to* reality along the radius leading to the future centre. They intimate that the "incompletely adjusted" person in the contemporary world may contain the elements of the world of the next generations, in short, that reality is dynamic. Such data are forcing the psychologist to face the thesis that history is the accumulation of minorities, and see the danger of a popularised idea of normalcy forcing the world into a premature entropy.

The idea of "adjustment", moreover, is not applied to the individual alone. It reappears in only a slightly different form in the idea of "integration" developed during the years since the war by the American school of psychology which has interested itself in group discussion. This school has studied cases of social conflict and evolved a technique for its resolution. The aim was to replace verbal dialectics, which end in a one-sided victory on points, and leave behind only an increased bitterness, by a form of discussion calculated to integrate the originally opposing views into a higher solution to which both sides contribute. Its advance in the develop-

ment of a technique has been noteworthy. But again there is the question of aim. Is integration, is the resolution of social differences, always desirable? That has been in general the school's assumption, the achievement in which it has found satisfaction. There are certain situations in which such integration is unquestionably desirable. Where opposing points of view consist of complexes of facts-plus-emotions, mutual discussion can most usefully sort out the contested facts and draw off the antagonistic emotions. But what of opposing views which represent intellectual positions? If these are genuine, they are evidence of personal configurations, of varying centres of gravity which permit only a certain displacement to their holders if the original position is to be maintained. Asking that these be integrated is asking that a variety of personal forms be abandoned in favor of a single common pattern.

The underlying basis of our present psychological treatment of both individuals and groups is thus fundamentally the same. The adjustment with which the psychologist is satisfied is an adjustment to something external, unitary and uniform. The individual is urged to look outside himself for the yardstick of his values, to make them not an inner growth but an outer acceptance. He is to look to a norm, which is always an idea and never a flesh and blood concretion, for the things which concern him alone as a man. For the things which concern him as a member of a group he is to join with a series of others in a composite search for social solutions. There is no place in such a system for the person who seeks to give concretion through his own personality to a certain definite form of life. Such a person chooses among the existing elements of social life; some he accepts and others he discards; both his acceptance and his rejection are part of a conscious plan which aims at a measure of self-consistency. Yet it may be questioned whether the social cross-fertilisation of personalities separated by clearly distinguishable differences is not more fruitful than the undifferentiated normalcy of a community in which conflict is reduced to a minimum.

The idea of normalcy can be laid at the door of nobody

in particular. The norm which it represents has grown up unconsciously as a parallel to case practice. The development of a method has exhausted the conscious energy of the practitioners. But an orientation is an indispensable part of any activity; it cannot be done without. Lacking a conscious alignment, the psychologist has perforce turned his methodology to the service of the implicit one which lay at hand, and by so doing has enormously strengthened it and given it a sanction. The public, of whose inertia the idea of the contemporary average, of the least possible displacement of the status quo, is an expression, flatters itself that its time-honored opinion has now received scientific confirmation. The psychologist has taken over an assumption. Until he works out a direction of his own, until he turns upon his own satisfactions the same acutely critical eye with which he analyses the cases in his charge, he has only realised half of the requirements of his calling.

Psychoanalyse und Christentum⁽¹⁾

ARVID RUNESTAMM

Psychoanalyse ist ihrem Ursprung nach eine medizinische Erscheinung. Sie erschien als eine besondere Technik zur Abhilfe von gewissen schweren psychischen Leiden, schwerer Hysterie, schwerer Zwangsneurose, etc. Bis dahin hatte sie keine grössere Ursache als jede andere Arztwissenschaft, mit dem Christentum in Konflikt zu geraten. Allerdings, insofern kommt sie ja von Anfang an dem Wirkungskreis des Christentums näher, als beide das geistige Leben zum Objekt ihrer Tätigkeit haben. Von christlicher Seite hat man ja jederzeit nicht in Abrede gestellt, dass auch die Seele im eigentlichen, medizinischen Sinne krank und heilungsbedürftig werden kann. Wir haben für diesen Zweck unsere Irrenhäuser, Psychiater und Nervenärzte. Das Verhältnis zwischen Arzt und Seelsorger war ja an diesem Punkt immer sehr empfindlich. Aber auch bei rein körperlichen, organi-

(1) Folgender Artikel gibt einen Extrakt meiner Schrift mit gleichlautendem Titel.

schen Krankheiten ist das Seelenleben mit im Spiel, verändert sich in nicht geringem Umfange gemäss dem körperlichen Zustand, „steigt“ und „fällt“ mit diesem und wird empfindlicher oder unempfindlicher für die Beeinflussung. Der Arzt kann in seiner Praxis diese Seite nicht unbeachtet lassen. Auf der ganzen Linie werden folglich des Seelsorgers und Arztes Arbeiten leicht miteinander kollidieren.

Eine neue Situation ist vorhanden von dem Augenblick an, da die Psychoanalyse beginnt, ihr Arbeitsfeld auszudehnen und ihre Ansprüche nicht nur für die schwereren Seelenkrankheiten geltend zu machen, die auf der Grenze zu dem eigentlichen Gebiet der Geisteskrankheiten stehen, sondern auch für die „leichteren“ Fälle, die in den religiösen Wirkungskreis und die allgemeine Seelsorgepraxis zu Hause gehören. Von diesen erweiterten Ansprüchen der Psychoanalyse gehe ich hier aus.

Das eine scheint klar: Soll der Psychoanalytiker jetzt die Rolle des Seelsorgers übernehmen, so wird er wesentlich dasselbe Problem zu behandeln haben, das dieser auf der Hand liegen hat, wenn nämlich die menschliche Seele nicht plötzlich total verändert worden ist und mit anderen Grundbedürfnissen, Trieben und Instinkten arbeitet, als sie früher getan hat. Welches sind diese Probleme? Für den Seelsorger konzentrieren sie sich rings um ein Phänomen: Schuld und Sühne genannt. Das ist wenigstens von alters her als Kern der Seelennot betrachtet worden. Der Analytiker nennt die Seelennot mit einem anderen Namen: Nervosität.

Sind Sünde und Schuld auf der einen Seite und Nervosität auf der anderen Seite dieselben Dinge? Und was ist eigentlich Nervosität?

Ein schwedischer Psychoanalytiker beantwortet diese letzte Frage so: „Wenn man eine allgemeine Definition über die Neurose geben will, so kann man sagen, dass derjenige ein Neurotiker ist, der nicht besitzt, was man eine volle Lebenseinstellung nennen würde, d.h. dem eine volle Hingebung zum Leben fehlt.“ Der ist — mit anderen Worten — ein Neurotiker, dessen Hingabetrieb in seiner Funktion gehemmt wird. Die Hemmungen liegen in sogenannten „Verdrängungen.“

Dieses Wort „Verdrängung“ hat eine besondere Bedeutung. Es bedeutet nämlich, dass der Trieb nicht in der Weise gehemmt wird, dass er ganz unterdrückt, sondern dass er gleichsam auf ein neues Geleise gelenkt und dort verbraucht wird. Der Triebwunsch ist mit seinem Affekthalt weggeschoben worden bis ins Unbewusste, wo er nun auf unterirdischem Weg eine verhängnisvolle Rolle in dem Denk-, Gefühls-, Willens- und Handlungsleben spielt.

Die Frage ist nun, welches jene Kraft ist, die den Hingabetrieb hemmt und verdrängt. Die Psychoanalytiker nennen hier an erster Stelle die moralischen Kräfte. Der Sexualtrieb und das moralische Bewusstsein können in einen Konflikt geraten, aus welchem eine Verdrängung und eine Neurose hervorgehen können, auf solche Weise nämlich, dass sich die sexuellen Triebe, Wünsche und Affektenergien in das Unterbewusstsein flüchten.

Man geht nun innerhalb der Psychoanalyse von einer allgemeinen Diagnose der Gegenwartspsyche aus und betont die unerhörte Ausbreitung der Nervosität in der Gegenwart; man meint, dass die neurosebildenden Konflikte entstehen, weil die moderne, zivilisierte Gesellschaft, Sitte und Moral allzu hohe Schranken für die freie Auslösung der Instinkte aufrichten und den Hingabetrieb, „die Auslösung der spontanen, naiven Lebenslust“, hemmen. Die Schwierigkeiten zum Beispiel, um in unserer modernen Gesellschaft eine frühzeitige Ehe zu schließen, sind einer der Herde der Nervosität. — Was ist nun vom psychologischen, ethischen und christlichen Standpunkt über diese Verdrängungstheorie und Ableitung der Neurose sowie über diese Gegenwartsdiagnose zu sagen? Nach meiner Auffassung müssen wir zuerst diesen Versuch, in die Tiefe der Seele zu dringen, als wertvoll anerkennen. Es steckt sicher richtiges in der Rede über eine Verdrängung von gewissen Kräften innerhalb des Menschen. Die Theologie hat unzweifelhaft viel davon zu lernen.

Wir alle haben schon die Erfahrung gemacht, dass sich bisweilen im Umgang mit anderen Menschen gleichsam eine unterirdische Welt zu regen beginnt, eine Welt, die sich nicht nur für andere, sondern auch für uns selbst verborgen hält. Das

kann etwas Einkapseltes sein, bitter, neidisch, rachsüchtig, das in einem unbewachten Augenblick Ausschluß findet, das dann hervorquillt und sich plötzlich freie Bahn macht. Es kann die Geste oder der Blick einer Person sein, die sich selbst unbewacht fühlt und deshalb den anstrengenden Beobachtungsdienst vernachlässigt, den der Mensch selbst, oft unbewusst, über seine eigenen Verdrängungen ausübt.

Aber können wir uns mit dieser einfachen Erklärung über das verwickelte Lebensproblem, das hier zur Diskussion steht, begnügen? Hat die gegenwärtige Seelennot ihren einzigen Grund in der Verdrängung sinnlicher Triebe von der einen oder anderen Art? Sind jene Theorien vom psychologischen Standpunkt haltbar?

Es gibt zwei Einwände, die man hier machen muss, welche zuletzt in ein Einziges zusammenfallen.

Ich habe vorhin angedeutet, welcher Instinkt es eigentlich ist, von dem die Analytiker meinen, dass er gestört und verdrängt wird. Es ist der Sexualinstinkt. Auch wenn man ihn so weit verfeinert, dass er identisch wird mit dem allgemeinen Lebensinteresse oder der psychischen Energie überhaupt, so ist es doch bei den orthodoxen Psychoanalytikern eigentlich immer das Sexuelle, das den Kern in dieser Lebensenergie bildet.

Nun kann man sich fragen: Steht es heute wirklich so, dass diese Instinkte so furchtbar gehemmt werden? Ist es nicht ebenso wahrscheinlich, dass die zur Nervosität führenden Verdrängungen von anderen, höheren Instinkten verursacht werden? Sind die religiösen und moralischen Instinkte, oder — wenn wir diese nicht „Instinkte“ nennen wollen: — die faktischen, hergebrachten und erworbenen religiösen und moralischen Kräfte, Gefühle, Vorstellungen schonender von den beherrschenden Strömungen unserer Zeit behandelt worden als die niederen Instinkte? Können es nicht diese höheren religiösen und moralischen Instinkte und Kräfte sein, die weggedrängt werden?

Wenn man die tieferen Ursachen der Nervosität in der Gegenwart finden will, so liegt es wohl zunächst auf der Hand, an das Verbot zu denken, mit welchem der Zeitgeist das religiöse und sittliche Empfinden belegt, und nicht in

erster Linie an die wahrlich nicht allzu starken Hemmungen zu denken, die der Zeitgeist auf die „Libido“, auf Instinkte und Triebe legt, die wir gewöhnlich als das Niedere im Menschenleben betrachten.

Damit habe ich den einen Einwand gegen die Verdrängungs- und Neurose-Lehre der Psychoanalyse berührt. Ich habe in Frage gestellt, ob nicht die Richtung und Ordnung zwischen den verdrängenden Kräften eine andere ist als die Psychoanalyse voraussetzt: ob es nicht die religiösen und moralischen Kräfte im Menschen sind, die das „Verdrängte“ anstatt das „Verdrängende“ sind, ob es nicht das Gewissen und die moralischen Kräfte sind, die „eingeklemmt“ werden und nun als verwirrende, dunkle, drohende oder sehnsuchtsvolle Stimmen in ihm auftreten.

Aber dieser Einwand bedeutet eigentlich nur die Vorstufe zu einem anderen. Dass eine Verdrängung entsteht, beruht im Grunde nicht darauf, dass der eine Trieb zu schwach und der andere zu stark war, sondern darauf, dass beide gleich stark oder zu schwach waren. Verdrängung und Neuroseherd in der Tiefe des Seelenlebens kommen nicht daher, dass die moralische Kraft, die dem unerlaubten Wunsch begegnet, zu stark gewesen ist, sondern dass sie zu schwach war. Sie ist nicht stark genug gewesen, um den Trieb zu beherrschen. Verdrängung und nicht Beherrschung wird es nämlich, wenn der Trieb, der sich durchsetzen will, zu schwach ist, dies zu tun, wenn die Kraft, die ihn zurückhält, auch zu schwach ist, um richtig mit dem Trieb fertig zu werden. Die Verdrängung ist somit eine Schwachheits- oder Ohnmachtsercheinung. Es ist nicht die Moral, die siegt, wenn sie den Trieb und den Affekt hemmt und „einklemmt“. Die Moral war zu schwach um zu siegen und zu stark, um den Trieb siegen zu lassen. Der Konflikt wird nicht gelöst, sondern aufgeschoben. Daher bildet der so entstandene psychische Zustand eine Mischung von schlechtem Gewissen und unbefriedigtem Trieb.

Man muss also mit einer anderen Ordnung und anderen Machtverhältnissen zwischen den Kräften im Menschen rechnen, als die Psychoanalyse es tut. Es ist nicht nur der Sexualtrieb oder irgend ein anderer Trieb, der verdrängt

wird von den „höheren“ Trieben; es ist ebenso die Gewissensregung und der moralische Anspruch, die von der „Libido“ verdrängt werden. Wenn man die Verdrängungen und Hemmungen recht versteht, so findet man wirklich eine grosse Uebereinstimmung zwischen der seelischen Not, die die Psychoanalytiker Nervosität oder Angst nennen, und den Nöten, die das Christentum Sünde, Schuld und Erlösungsbedürfnis nennt.

Dies kann noch deutlicher gemacht werden. Wenn der „Fehler“ am Gegenwartsmenschen darin liegt, dass die moralische Autorität nicht stark genug ist, um den Menschen so zu bezwingen und ihn in das Geheimnis der Versöhnung hineinzutreiben, so liegt die Ursache nicht allein im Mangel an starker *sittlicher* Autorität, vielmehr zuletzt im Mangel an einer starken *religiösen* Autorität. Der nervöse moderne Mensch hat keine Autorität gefunden, der er sich ganz hingeben, sich bedingungslos in die Arme werfen kann. Hier kann ich nun an den Hauptgedanken der Psychoanalyse anknüpfen und dem Wahrheitsmoment in ihr Gerechtigkeit widerfahren lassen. Die Psychoanalyse hat ein richtiges Gefühl dafür, dass die Grundursache der Nervosität darin liegt, dass der spontane Lebensinstinkt sich nicht ausleben kann, dass hemmende Mächte ihn binden. Würden wir dies in der altmodischen Sprache der Religion ausdrücken, so würde es heissen: Die Psychoanalyse hat gezeigt, dass das, was der Mensch vor allem braucht, Freiheit vom Gesetz ist. Er leidet unter dem Gesetz, das ihn hindert, seinem Hingebungstrieb Ausdruck zu geben. In vielen Formen kann das Gesetz gedeihen, als Natur- wie als Moralgesetz. Aber es ist immer die gleiche Macht, die eifersüchtig die Tür verschliesst, durch die sich die Kräfte des Sichausgebens einen Ausweg suchen. Es ist zuletzt das Hingebungsbedürfnis, die Liebe, die eingeschlossen und verdrängt ist.

Soweit die Psychoanalyse mit Worten wie „Libido“ und „Eros“ nur ausdrücken will, dass die Hingabe die tiefste Lebenskraft im Menschen ist, so hat sie sicherlich auch vom christlichen Standpunkt aus recht. Sie will aber auch die Hingebungsader im Menschen öffnen und ist damit auf demselben Weg, den das Christentum geht. Die Frage ist nur,

wie man diese Ader öffnen soll. Nach der Psychoanalyse soll das dadurch geschehen, dass sie die an Unfreiheit leidenden Menschen mit analytischer Hilfe zum Bewusstsein des dunklen Lebens bringt, das in ihm unbewusst wütet, damit er lernt, sich selbst zu akzeptieren und sich selbst zu sein. Auch das braucht dem christlichen Denken nicht zuwider zu sein. Es gilt wirklich für den Menschen, auch nach der christlichen Auffassung, sich selbst kennen zu lernen.

Aber kommt der Mensch durch die Psychoanalyse wirklich ans rechte Tageslicht? Lernt er sich dadurch so sehen, wie er wirklich ist?

Hadfield sagt in seinem Buch „Psychoanalyse und Moral“ : „ Uns selbst zu sehen, wie wir wirklich sind, ist eine Sache von höchster Wichtigkeit. Es geschieht bisweilen, wenn ein neues Ideal uns vorschwebt und wir uns damit vergleichen, wie bei der Religion. Es kann auch durch Analyse geschehen. Der Sinn der Analyse ist, den ganzen Menschen aufzudecken und ihn sich selbst zu offenbaren. Dies gibt stets eine Ueberraschung, oft einen Schock.“ Religion und Psychoanalyse werden also Seite an Seite gestellt, wie zwei gleichwertige Mächte. Sowohl auf die eine, wie auch auf die andere Art soll ein Mensch sich selbst erkennen können. Und durch diese Selbsterkenntnis soll Erlösung und Befreiung gewonnen werden. Das Selbst-erkennen kann nun so verwirklicht werden, dass wir in der Religion vor ein Ideal gestellt werden. Hadfield denkt natürlich an das Bild Jesu Christi. In diesem können wir uns spiegeln, uns analysieren. In ihm sehen wir, welcher Art wir sind. Der andere Weg, den Hadfield am meisten empfiehlt, ist der der Psychoanalyse. Und, wohl gemerkt, auch dabei ist ein Menschenbild als Spiegel tätig. Was für ein Menschenbild ist das? Die Antwort ist : Der Mensch, der von der Libido, von der Sexualität bestimmt ist, der „ natürliche “ Mensch, der mit Rohmaterial und sinnlicher Urkraft erfüllt und zur Sublimierung der Triebe bestimmt ist.

Kein Christ wird leugnen, dass die in die Tiefe dringende Selbsterkenntnis vor Christi Bild eine Selbstanalyse bedeutet, die Erlösung und Befreiung zur Folge haben kann. Darin hat Hadfield recht. Was erlebt der Mensch hier? Er sieht

nicht nur sittlich indifferentes Rohmaterial, er sieht Sünde, Bosheit und Schuld. Aber er sieht auch noch etwas anderes, das jedoch leicht entflieht, wenn man es ansehen will. Es bebt darinnen von Ahnung und Sehnsucht, es sind gleichsam Hände, die sich ausstrecken und das Bild des einzig wahren Menschen erfassen wollen. Es ist die Trauer über die versäumten Möglichkeiten; es ist wie ein verlassenes, schlecht behandeltes Kind, das weint. Ich glaube, ich brauche keine weiteren Bilder mehr zu benützen. Das Christentum kennt ein ausdrucksvolles Wort für dieses Schwerbestimmbare, Feine und Zarte im Menschen: „Das Ebenbild Gottes“ nennt es das Christentum. Und es ist das Ebenbild Gottes im Menschen, das aufwacht aus seinem Schlummer, wenn das tiefst Menschliche und Gottähnliche zugleich ihn anrührt. Das ist die einfache Psychologie der Bibel und des Christentums.

Was bleibt von diesen schüchternen Kräften im Menschen bei der Bespiegelung im Menschenbild der Psychoanalyse? Was wird aus Verantwortung, Schuld und Sünde? Lernt der Mensch sich wirklich selbst kennen? Die bebende Tiefe, die Ahnung, die Hingebung, der Glaube, „das Kind“, das sich nach Freiheit und Liebe sehnt, das Bild Gottes? Sie finden keinen Platz. Sie müssen sich verbergen, um nicht besudelt zu werden. Die tiefste Hingebung wird nicht geweckt, und wird sie geweckt, so ist ihr Leben in Gefahr.

Man soll sich selbst akzeptieren, heisst es in der Psychoanalyse, mit allen seinen Trieben und Neigungen, und sich ihnen nicht verschliessen, sie nicht verdrängen. Das ist richtig, wenn damit nur gemeint ist, man soll den Mut haben, sich selbst zu sehen, wie man wirklich ist und ohne Schminke und Vorstellung seine Simpelheit, Sünde und Bosheit erkennen. Aber es ist auch eine Gefahr darin vorhanden, sich selbst zu bejahren, sowie man vor dem psychoanalytischen Normalmenschen steht. Sich vor diesem Bilde selbst zu akzeptieren kann bedeuten: nicht nur die Triebe zu bekennen und zu bejahren, die einen faktisch beherrschen, sondern auch Triebe in sein Leben einzulassen, die früher keine Rolle spielten. In der Begegnung mit dem von der Libido beherrschten Menschenbild liegt eine Gefahr der Verunreinigung.

Die Begegnung mit ihm kann eine verhängnisvolle Herabsetzung und ein Belügen seiner selbst und seines Schöpfers bedeuten. Das Bild vom Triebmenschen sagt: „So bist Du“. Und die Gefahr ist, dass man antwortet: „Ja, so bin ich!“ und mit dieser Antwort etwas Zartes, Feines aufgibt, was man früher besass.

Die Psychoanalyse wird auf diese Weise nicht nur schlechtes Christentum, sondern auch schlechte Psychologie. Es ist etwas in der menschlichen Seele, das sich vor dem technischen Griff und auch vor dem analysierenden Gedanken verbirgt. Und das ist die grösste Tiefe in ihr. Wenn ich die Analyse nicht akzeptieren kann, so ist es nicht nur darum, weil sie keinen Platz hat für die historischen Daten des Christentums, sondern weil sie eine so jammervolle Psychologie hat, die in ihrem Schema keinen Platz hat für die feinsten Regungen der menschlichen Seele.

Damit will ich nicht gesagt haben, dass die praktische Psychoanalyse keine rechtmässige Aufgabe habe. Sie kann vielleicht „Grobarbeit“ ausführen und eine Hilfe sein, wo der Seelsorger keine Mittel für die Besserung hat. Und in eines christlichen Psychoanalytikers Hand kann sie noch mehr ausrichten. Aber solche christlichen Psychoanalytiker haben wir lange vor der Psychoanalyse gehabt. Sie kann vielleicht auf den tiefsten Lagen Harmonie herstellen, gewisse Hindernisse für die Befreiung des Hingabetriebes wegräumen, Wege bahnen, aber doch nur Hilfswege. Sie kann vielleicht die Hingabe auf Aufgaben im Dienste des eigenen Glückes, der Kultur und des Menschengestes hinweisen. Aber das Hingeben wird diesmal nicht derselbe geistige Akt sein, wie der, welcher vom christlichen Erlösungsglauben an Gott ausgeht. Hier ist die Grenze ganz klar zu erkennen. Und ich wehre mich gegen jeden Versuch, diese Grenze zu vertuschen.

Die Psychoanalyse will Gesundheit und sieht nicht, dass es Gesundheit und Harmonie auf verschiedenen Ebenen gibt. Es gibt eine seelische Gesundheit, die das Todessiegel auf ihrer Stirn trägt und die schlimmer als Krankheit ist. Es zeugt von einem geistig höheren Standpunkt, sich zu den Kranken zu rechnen, die Hilfe benötigen, als zu den Gesunden, die keinen Arzt brauchen.

Die Psychoanalyse hat den Anspruch an den Menschen und seine Möglichkeiten zu niedrig gestellt. Sie reisst den Hebel leicht weg, der sie vorwärts und aufwärts führen sollte. Der Hebel heisst : sittlicher Ernst und sittlicher Konflikt. Es ist eine Wahnvorstellung, dass der sittliche Konflikt nur etwas Böses ist und mit einer entschuldigenden Erklärung aus der Welt geschafft werden muss. Der Schuldkonflikt ist der Sprengstoff, mit Hilfe dessen der Menscheng Geist sich immer wieder in den harten Granit der Wirklichkeit hineinbohrt. Löse diesen Konflikt psychoanalytisch, und diese Sprengstoffenergie wird sich auf anderem Wege entladen und verbraucht werden, ohne zu sprengen. Das Christentum will durch den Schuldkonflikt zur Harmonie in eine grössere Tiefe gelangen und achtet weniger auf den Wellenschlag an der Oberfläche des Lebens. Der Schuldkonflikt soll nicht aus der Welt geschafft werden ! Er soll lebendig und frisch erhalten werden. Er soll vertieft und verschärft werden, indem er vor das Antlitz eines liebevollen Vaters gebracht wird. Unser Schuldgefühl ist krank, weil wir Sein Bild aus den Augen verloren haben. Es ist Nervosität geworden. Deshalb muss es gereinigt und bewusst gemacht werden. Das Seltsame ist, dass es erst in der Vergebung wirklich rein und bewusst werden kann. Das ist eine psychologische Tatsache. Das tiefe Schuldgefühl ist eins mit dem Vergebungsglauben. Das Schuldgefühl ist gesund, wenn die Schuld vergeben ist, und es lebt in der Sonne der göttlichen Liebe. Ueber dieses Paradoxon kommt das Christentum nicht hinweg.

THE STUDENT WORLD CHRONICLE

Voices from East and West on the Personal Conception of God

We hear a great deal about the insufficiency of the Christian conception of God. Scientists, moralists and artists are proposing that we should give up the idea of a personal God. They tell us that we have come to a period which can do without these remnants of a primitive outlook on the universe. They advocate a conception of God culminating in the ideas of the harmony of the universe or of the totality of human ideals or of the impersonal urge behind nature. Others again declare that it does not matter what conception of God one has as long as one is "religious".

At the same time Christians are rediscovering that the personal conception of God is central in Christian faith. Many go even further. They discover that the personal conception of God is a *conditio sine qua non* of human life worthy of that name. They find that it is not just a possible conception among others, but the very cornerstone of life. Here are two recent pronouncements of Christian leaders, one by Dr. T.Z. Koo in a lecture on China given in America and one by Professor J.L. Hromadka in an article on the foundations of European culture which he wrote after returning from India. Dr. Koo says :

"When a people loses its contact with the vital personality of God, a God greater than anything the human mind and heart can conceive of, that people soon begins to lose its vision. And when a people loses its vision, its creative capacity steadily dies out. There was a time when the Chinese were a creative people. In art, literature, industry, philosophy, government and science, we have been discoverers and pioneers. But for the last 1000 years or so, we seem suddenly to have lost our creative capacity and have been living merely on our past. I attribute this malady of arrested growth to our losing contact with the idea and personality of a Great Spiritual being, a Heaven, or God. Through the teaching of Confucius, God as a spiritual personality gradually receded into the background and finally became only an abstract principle. We have let our mind wander away from Him and have been content to deal only on the human plane. When we deal only on this plane we are pledging allegiance to a code of morals. The man who does that is like the man who is sitting on a chair trying to raise himself by lifting the seat of the chair ; he remains where he is. But when man is in contact with the Great Spirit personality of God, then he is owing allegiance to a personality outside of himself. This man is also sitting on the

chair, but his hands are holding on to something outside of and greater than himself, and so he rises.

Therefore, in modern China our need is not only for scientific or material development. These things are not going to help us fundamentally. To me the far greater need is for our people to regain our contact with God. Only through this contact, can a great people regenerate itself. Without re-establishing this spiritual contact with God we can at best but be imitators of other peoples."

And Professor Hromadka says :

" The faith in the Creator is the background of the European mentality. It forms even the thought life of those Europeans who have lost this faith. It creates personal life in the real sense of the word. Personality has only a meaning if it means something which cannot be repeated, which is truly unique. It is the biblical faith in the Creator which has made this conception of personality possible. It confronts the soul with a Judge to Whom it is responsible and Who presents personal claims to it. In the light of this faith the soul has real existence. It has been created by a special divine decision. It is not only the shadow of a metaphysical substance, not just chance, not a combination of certain natural elements. Only in the light of faith in the Creator does the soul have its history, its task, its meaning, its personal aim. Only in this light does it lead a life of dramatic and dynamic tension. For it is responsible and willing to render account of all things before God.

Faith in the Creator is the foundation of the highest and most valuable of that which Europe has produced, of its dynamics, its activity, its strong emphasis on the personal. Pantheistic speculation is under all circumstances fateful. Every religious or philosophical tendency which denies faith in the Creator leads sooner or later to fatalism, pessimistic resignation, or dull indifference. The " decline of the West " will begin at the moment when the last survivors of this faith have gone ".

The Australian Student Movement on Prayer and Service

The Australian S.C.M. has felt the need of a reconsideration of its message to students. After having changed its Aim and Basis in 1927 its leaders have given ample time to a study of the implications of the main ideas contained in this document. We quote two sections from a statement which summarises the results of this study.

Prayer.

The Executive of the Movement went into retreat for two days in the middle of July, taking "Prayer" as subject for discussion, because this is the subject that appears to be specially in the mind of the Movement at the present time. The return to this subject is in the natural sequence of the great questions which have occupied the Movement's mind in recent years.

We set out to ask ourselves afresh the question: "What is Prayer" and to find as full and clear an answer as possible to that question in the Lord's Prayer...

The opening words of the Lord's Prayer are the best expression of man's approach to God. They call us into the Presence of God, the Spirit, Who is Father of our human spirits, Who, also, is "Holy", with the awe-inspiring mystery of the Infinite and the Perfect to finite and imperfect creatures like us. It is as we realise God the Spirit, Creative of All in and through all things, and especially as we realise Him "Personal" in Christ, that we can really "pray".

But the only Prayer that counts is life. We are to pray, "Thy Kingdom come; Thy Will be done, as in Heaven so on earth", not with our lips, but with our lives. God does not need us to tell Him, or exhort Him, to do that which His whole Being is intent upon; and He knows what is in our hearts far better than we ourselves do, whatever we may say. But He does need our lives — brought to Him and laid at His feet, as a free-will offering — because His Great Adventure is that He has given us wills which are our own; and God's Will cannot be done unless our wills are conformed to His; nor can His Kingdom come except in the hearts and lives of men and women who are willing to do His Will.

It is the prayer that is life that tells, and the life that is prayer. Only on that basis is our Basis possible, with its tremendous practical proposition: "That Christian faith in God challenges men and women to devote themselves wholly to the service of the Kingdom of God". And that is why the one positive petition of the Lord's Prayer is so important: "Give us day by day our daily bread". For, the life that is prayer builds upon the great promise that "these things" (the material necessities for the life of service) "shall be added" to those who "seek the Kingdom", not to those who make professions of seeking it, but to those whose seeking actually puts this great promise to the touch, "to win or lose it all". This petition is concerned with terrific realities for those who stake their lives upon it.

Service.

We in the A.S.C.M. have sought to express the true conception of service in the phrase "the devotion of the whole life to the service of the Kingdom of God", declaring our conviction that this is of the very essence of Christian Faith in God.

What does this kind of service involve?

To begin with, it means that we have caught a glimpse of the high destiny of the human race, for every individual the opportunity of full development as a child of God, and for the race a common life in the one divine family, all its relations controlled by the principle of love. It means that we have become aware that for the accomplishment of His purpose God asks and needs the cooperation of all His children who have seen something of that purpose.

It means, too, that we realise that the highest service which we can do for any man is to help him to enter into his heritage as a child of God, to become conscious of His Father's Love, and to respond to it. But many of God's children are so hemmed in by their environment and so held down by physical conditions that the development of the life of the spirit is nearly impossible. So the service of the Kingdom, to be effective, must include every kind of effort to get rid of the hampering conditions and to create an environment in which such development is possible for all. And here we see the bearing of much unselfish work that is not recognised as religious, but is surely unconscious service of the Kingdom of God. But all such work becomes most effective when it is related to the highest end — that of helping men and women to come into touch with God.

Then this conception of service is something which involves the whole of life — every moment of it and every department of it. It involves the choice of a career, and the way we shall fulfil that career. It involves the use of our personal gifts, our time, our money. It concerns every human interest, and every human relationship.

This is no easy business, and yet it is the only way of life capable of giving full satisfaction to the human spirit. Augustine's famous dictum "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they find rest in Thee", can with truth be extended to mean "Our hearts are restless till they find their true activity in the service of Thy Kingdom".

The Federation and Evangelism

The question of the meaning of evangelism is a burning one in many Movements. We can only solve it in the light of our own his-

tory. A valuable contribution toward the understanding of this history is given by Gordon Troup in the magazine of the S.C.M. of New Zealand :

“Evangelism in the Federation has a varied and interesting history, interesting to us not only because its history is in great part the story of the spiritual pilgrimage of the Federation, but also because that story closely parallels our own experience. Evangelism was at the beginning in the Federation ; indeed, it may be said truly to have been the beginning of the Federation. It took, then, the form of an acute concern for other people's souls, whether those of the far-distant heathen, or of one's immediate neighbours. The movement was then intimately linked with great world-wide missions of the Moody and Sankey type. Nowadays it is the fashion to think and talk patronisingly of this bygone emphasis, with its “ buttonholing ”, its “ decision meetings ”, its “ testimonies ”, and so forth. But it made a real dent on the university life of its time — witness the fact that by its agency in one year practically the entire Oxford Boat, and the captain of the First Eleven at that University, were in striking fashion enlisted in the missionary enterprise and inaugurated a great revival of missionary interest and service in British universities.

Then came Drummond, with his trend towards reconciling science and religion, and the Bible and apologetic study which received new impetus at that time so as to become practically a new activity. Evangelism then meant enlisting students in active daily Bible Study and “ Spiritual Gymnastics ” to the end that they might bring to their studies a mind consecrated to the harmonising of religion with modern thought and at the same time sufficiently in touch with the life of Prayer and Meditation to be an active permeating influence, none the less effective than the older “ buttonholing ”, for its being silent. In continuation of the same line, only much later in date, came social and international study, the justification for their finding a central place in S.C.M. activities being always that they made a link between what students were passionately concerned about, on the one hand, and the Christian message and solution for those same things on the other. Thus it was steadily sought to drive people back on a study of the Bible, especially the Gospels, and to interest them in prayer as the only adequate source of power for the tasks envisaged by the study.

The war set in a foremost place what had always been fairly prominent, in Anglo-Saxon movements at least : the service side of the Christian Gospel. Endless outlets for this were provided during those four and a half years, and when hostilities had ceased the Federation embarked on one of its most significant bits of pioneering,

in setting its hand to European Student Relief, and uniting students in Europe and beyond in a "work-fellowship" that transcended all barriers. Most people were surprised at the undeniable spiritual values released in this process. Certain it is that thousands of students "found themselves" and found God in one phase or other of this enterprise. The recent emphases on international relations, and on Fellowship generally, may be said to be a direct outcome of the fruitage of I.S.S., as it has now become, a child of the Federation that has lost no time in coming of age and embarking on a semi-independent career.

What has not been so obvious as these movements taking place on the front of the Federation stage is the effect of growing inter-confessionalism, not as yet wholesale, but "through creeks and inlets making", as it were. In proportion as more Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic members find their way into our fellowship, their view of evangelism, which to them, as to us, is a vital question, becomes clearly contrasted with ours, a sort of synthesised Protestant view, which has been that of the Federation hitherto. Broadly speaking, the Roman Catholic view has much more of authority in it than we are accustomed to. And be it said that the appeal of authority to large sections of the student world is at present an extraordinarily strong one, after the fruitless "liberty" and "go-as-you-please" of war and post-war years. On the other hand, Evangelism as our Orthodox friends view it seems to involve a far deeper experience of fellowship than the comradeship which we so airily call by that name. For them, centering in the church, there is a sort of betrothal of the endurance to the Orthodox community, a blending of mystical and æsthetic, mental and sensuous expression, a devoted passion that we know little of. So diverse are these views of evangelism, which I was at once able to hear expounded by very able Catholic, Russian and Protestant exponents at a conference, that one begins to wonder whether they have anything in common at all. But it is clear on fair analysis that the central thing in all and for all these different "Evangelisms" is the figure of Christ. With different implications and associations for each, He is the real inspiration and Guide.

The Federation and World Affairs

"Awake! Budding World Citizens" is the title of an editorial by Dr. Tatlow in the November issue of the "Student Movement", the organ of the Student Christian Movement of Great Britain and Ireland. Dr. Tatlow feels that the members of the Federation

are not living up to their opportunity and responsibility. He believes that they could exert a great influence for good in the present international situation. But he wonders whether they are doing anything at all in this most important realm. Why does he wonder? Because he did not get a real response to his editorial in the March 1928 "Student Movement" on the same subject. That editorial was a challenge to courageous international action and invited contributions from all other countries. But the result was disappointing. Only one movement responded. All others were silent. He concludes:

"But we are not satisfied. We are told that one in every six of the student population of the world is a member of a constituent branch of the World's Student Christian Federation, a large enough body to wield a weighty influence in the world. Yet it does not pull its weight. We do not decry what individuals have done. We rejoice that thousands of old Student Movement members all over the world are working for understanding and goodwill between the nations. In East and West individuals are a great power for good. But what of all our movements as movements at the present time? Are we doing enough to train men and women who will not only be good citizens of their own country, but who will take their share with intelligence and sympathy in relation to the opportunities and obligations of world citizenship which come to all civilised men today?

And what about, say, the French, Italian and Japanese Student Christian Movements? We hear nothing from them on this subject. What are their members thinking and doing? Will not the Federation find out and tell us? A bulletin comes round to the editors of all national Student Christian Movement journals from the Federation. We reprint a good deal of it each month under "Federation News". It gives us a surfeit of information about summer conferences and such like things. But we should like to hear more of the ideas with which movements are working, more about the ideals which they are trying to inculcate in their members. We name the French, Italian and Japanese Movements above because they are Movements in countries as deeply concerned as we and the Americans are with naval disarmament. Are these movements concerned about this question? Are they training their members to care about it? It cannot be the will of God that we should build up navies against one another. It cannot be that God does not care about such matters."

We are glad that Dr. Tatlow continues to challenge the membership of the Federation to be awake to the decisiveness of the present hour. For no one who knows anything about world affairs can deny that we live in a time of great decisions. And no single movement

— the Federation as a whole least of all — can afford to disregard the voices of threatening danger and the voices of unexpected opportunity which come to us from the realm of international politics. In the “ Call ” for the “ Day of Prayer ” our chairman has emphasised our common responsibility toward the future international order in unambiguous terms. If therefore we do not quite follow Dr. Tatlow in his conclusions it is not because lack interest in the cause for which he pleads.

Are the national movements in the Federation as sound asleep as Dr. Tatlow thinks? We do not believe it. On the contrary we see a number of signs which make us very hopeful for the future. Dr. Tatlow's conclusion is by no means the inevitable one. The fact that other national movements have not more eagerly responded to a question raised in the magazine of one movement is to be deplored, but it does not necessarily imply the gloomy conclusion that the others are not interested in the question raised. After all the very few in the other movements into whose hands the “ Student Movement ” comes would not naturally use that paper as an open forum in which to discuss the question. Others who might have not answered are not sufficiently acquainted with the language in which the “ Student Movement ” is written to reply. The reports from the various movements indicate that there is a genuine and growing concern for world affairs. A glance at national movement magazines or at the programmes of their conferences (this is one of the reasons why the News Sheet speaks so often of conferences) shows this to be true. What the Czecho-Slovak Movement does to foster understanding between the various national groups in Czecho-Slovakia, what Max Yergan does in South Africa, what Dr. van Doorn does in the Dutch East Indies, what Mr. Corbett does with his international institute in America, is to contribute to the “ building of bridges ”. In the case of countries where the everyday life of students does not raise international problems the only contribution which their movements can make is the one of through international study. But on that point also we can produce an interesting record. There are few movements which do not in some way or another participate in the study of international questions. The magazines of the Australian and Canadian Movements are especially interesting along this line. That the Chinese students are deeply interested in international relations everyone knows. The Dutch Movement has recently gone through a period of passionate discussions on the attitude of the Movement toward war. No number of the “ Student World ” has aroused such universal interest and has been ordered in such quantities as the one on the “ International Task of the Federation ”.

Dr. Tatlow thinks more especially of the question of naval disarmament and of the five great powers on whom that question depends. Unfortunately the movements in one or two of these countries are not among the strongest within the Federation. This is not their fault, but rather the result of circumstances — religious and political — which are outside their power to control. It would not be fair to expect from a movement which struggles against overwhelming difficulties within its nation the same type of effort and achievement which we may justifiably expect from a prosperous and strong organisation.

We thank Dr. Tatlow for his challenge. Like him we are not satisfied. Nobody is. We all need more courage and more devotion to the cause of Christ in international life, and perhaps more faith in the power of our national movements to help in creating a Christian public opinion in the different countries.

BOOK REVIEWS

BRAHMANE ET PARIA, par Dhan Gopal Mukerji. *Traduit de l'anglais par Sophie Godet. Editions Victor Attinger, Paris, Neuchâtel. Prix: 15 fr.*

Nous avons apprécié en son temps le charme prenant et l'esprit d'observation de Dhan Gopal Mukerji dans « My Brother's Face » qui, à notre connaissance, n'a pas été traduit en français. Cet auteur nous donne aujourd'hui dans *Brahmane et Paria* une analyse singulièrement attachante du contraste qui le frappe entre l'Orient et l'Occident. Il ne polémise pas, il ne cherche pas à réfuter les auteurs qui jugent l'Orient, et l'Inde en particulier, à travers les lunettes d'un Occidental. Sous une forme poétique et imagée, par petites touches, il fait vivre sous nos yeux des scènes intimes et charmantes du milieu brahmane auquel il appartient ; il les illustre de pensées et d'une philosophie de la vie, à la fois simples et profondes qu'il fait exprimer par une mère vénérée. Il révèle, sans avoir l'air d'y toucher, la place centrale qu'occupe la mère dans la vie de famille et l'influence spirituelle et morale qui rayonne d'elle.

C'est, présentée avec art mais sans apprêt, une apologie de l'Inde, de ses coutumes, de ses croyances. L'auteur en montre surtout les côtés lumineux, il n'en cèle pas pour cela les ombres : « Dans tous les sanctuaires de l'Inde, vous trouverez — dit-il — deux sortes de gens, les plus saints et les plus impies, les saints vous apportent le salut et les impies vous volent votre bourse ». Mais, ce qui frappe le

plus dans ces pages tout imprégnées d'amour natal et d'étonnement devant l'Occident étranger, c'est que l'auteur se refuse à juger : il peint, il compare, il admire, il s'étonne, il ne critique pas, il ne conclut jamais. Cette attitude frappe d'autant plus dans la description sans amertume, mais fort suggestive qu'il fait de ses expériences d'étudiant étranger sans ressource en Amérique, qui vit d'expédients et qui, pour ne pas mourir de faim, accepte philosophiquement les besognes les plus pénibles. Il semble n'y avoir fréquenté que les milieux en révolte contre la société capitaliste, des socialistes avancés, quelques anarchistes ; il se trouve mêlé sans l'avoir recherché aux pratiques d'un groupe spirite.

C'est ainsi que de ce contraste entre l'Inde dont il met en lumière la mystique, l'amour familial et la simplicité, et les Etats-Unis dont il décrit quelques êtres d'exception, il se dégage un « jugement de valeur », sans doute artificiel et partial, mais sur lequel tout Occidental réfléchi se doit de méditer.

Mukerji, qui doit avoir vu de l'Occident beaucoup plus qu'il n'en dit dans *Brahmane et Paria*, prévient la critique en faisant préluder sa seconde partie par ces mots : « Il y a un abîme entre l'âme orientale et l'âme occidentale, on dirait deux phares se dressant chacun sur son promontoire pour illuminer l'une des rives d'un détroit et laissant dans une obscurité complète le bras de mer à traverser. C'est cette traversée que je me proposais d'entreprendre, bien que je ne me fisse, au temps dont il s'agit, aucune idée de l'aventure que j'allais tenter, ni du changement immense qu'elle inaugurerait pour moi ».

Il y a beaucoup à moissonner dans la première partie, la seconde bien qu'écrite avec art est décevante et superficielle, de l'ensemble se dégage néanmoins un parfum de sincérité, une poésie et un sens du divin que la traductrice a rendus avec le talent qu'on lui connaît. C'est en première page, ou en conclusion, qu'on voudrait trouver cette citation, l'ultime conseil d'une mère au fils qu'elle ne reverra plus : « Garde toujours ouvertes les portes de ton âme, afin qu'aucune vérité divine ne soit obligée de se retirer pour avoir trouvé la porte fermée ».

H. L. H.

THEOLOGISCHE BEKENTNISSE, von Franz Spemann. *Furche-Verlag, Berlin, 1929. Preis: RM 7.50.*

Es wäre keine leichte Aufgabe Spemann's Buch in das richtige Fach einer Bibliothek zu stellen. Damit ist gesagt, dass die „Theologische Bekenntnisse“ fast einzig in ihrer Art sind. Es handelt sich

um Theologie, aber es hat nichts von einem theologiegeschichtlichen Handbuch. Es handelt sich um Bekenntnisse, aber das Hauptinteresse ist nicht biographisch beschreibend. Die fesselnde Kraft des Buches steckt gerade darin, dass der Verfasser eine ungewöhnliche Verbindung zu stand gebracht hat zwischen dem nur Theologischen und dem nur Persönlichen. Noch schwieriger aber ist es, den Standpunkt des Verfassers irgendwie theologisch festzulegen. Er ist ein Künstler, der dem Aesthetizismus Kampf ansagt; ein Pietist, der sich bei Barth zu Hause fühlt, ein moderner Mensch, der in seinem massiven Bibeldogma auch die besten Orthodoxen hinter sich lässt.

Wäre sein Buch gemeint als Beitrag zur theologischen Diskussion der Gegenwart, so würde diese paradoxe Art nicht als Vorzug rechnen können. Es ist aber etwas ganz anderes. Es ist ein persönliches Wort an alle, die sich mit Theologie befassen. Es ist ein Wort der Seelsorge an Menschen, die nur allzu leicht ihre gedankliche Arbeit als Selbstzweck anzusehen geneigt sind und nur allzu wenig fragen nach den Beziehungen zwischen dieser Arbeit und dem göttlichen und menschlichen Leben.

Wir haben schon manche Psychologien der Weltanschauungen gehabt. Spemann gibt uns sozusagen eine Probe einer „Psychologie der Theologischen Standpunkte“. Er bleibt dabei aber nicht im Relativismus stecken denn er hat einen Massstab: die biblische Wahrheit. Von diesem Gesichtspunkt sucht er die vielen theologischen Anschauungen, die in seinem reichen Leben an ihm vorübergegangen sind, zu verstehen. Er macht dabei Ernst mit der einfachen Tatsache, dass Theologie Menschenwerk ist, und dass Theologen nicht nur rein gedanklich aber auch als lebendige Menschen zu begreifen sind.

Es ist darum keine Schwäche sondern ein Vorzug des Buches, dass es auf Systematik keinen Wert legt. In dieser Weise wird uns klar, wie ein geistig reger Mensch auf theologische Gedanken reagiert und werden wir zu einem tieferen Verständnis für die Aufgabe der Theologie in der Gemeinde geholfen.

Wir vom Weltbunde sollten für dieses Buch besonders dankbar sein, weil es uns den geistigen Hintergrund der Deutschen Bewegung so viel besser verstehen lässt, und weil es zeigt, wie man als Studentenfürer im Sperrfeuer der Auseinandersetzungen seiner Überzeugung treu und doch lebendig bleiben kann. Für die jüngere Generation sind die Abschnitte über die seelsorgerliche Bedeutung der dialektischen Theologie von Barth und seinen Freunden wohl die wichtigsten. Alle diejenigen, die in Barth nichts anderes finden können als weltfremde Scholastik, oder auch diejenigen, die Barth wohl teilweise verstehen aber gar nicht einsehen, was das mit ihrem Leben zu tun

hat, werden hier Förderung erfahren. Spemann gibt uns sicher nicht den ganzen Barth — wie wäre das auch in so wenigen Seiten und bei seiner besonderen Vorgeschichte möglich? — aber er zeigt in sehr deutlicher Weise dass Barth uns allen, ob wir Theologen sind oder nicht, etwas Wichtiges zu sagen hat und dass (wie immer) diese Wahrheit - wenn sie als Wahrheit gesehen wird - nicht eine quälende sondern eine befreiende ist.

So ist Spemann's Buch ungemein reichhaltig. Wir dürfen dankbar sein, dass es aus den Kreisen unseres Weltbundes gekommen ist.

V 't H.

DIE KRISIS DER ENGLISCHEN STAATSKIRCHE, von Kurt Böhme.
Verlag: Leopold Klotz, Gotha, Thüringen, Germany, 1929.

One of the most encouraging signs of progress of the œcumenical movement is the interest in literature about churches and church-life in other lands which is being shown in such countries as Germany, France and Sweden. While a good many other countries are yet in that anomalous situation that they cannot provide their theologians and laymen with any more up-to-date information about other countries than that which has passed into the great text books of church history — these have now a continuous stream of trustworthy publications about the actual trends of thought and problems of christianity in many parts of the world.

The series " For the Unity of the Church " of which Dr. Böhme's booklet is the fourth number, ought to play an important rôle in this work of " opening the windows " of one Christian group to another. Rather than of generalisations or superficial impressions we are now in need of thorough study in order to really get to know each other. Oecumenical work is meaningless as long as it is not based on a deep sympathetic understanding of churches other than our own.

Dr. Böhme's contribution is a good example of such an approach. He gives a most painstaking account of all the facts which are relevant to the understanding of the prayer-book controversy in England. It is a good thing to read as one story what otherwise can only be gleaned from innumerable articles and news items.

Lic. Laun provides the background for the understanding of these facts by a most interesting analysis of the character of the Church of England. What he says about the general misunderstanding of this Church on the continent is very illuminating. Protestants generally tend to make the easy assumption that the Church of England is Protestant or that it ought to be Protestant. Lic. Laun

makes the point that it is of the greatest importance for the future of œcumenical Christianity that the Church of England is a "bridge-church" and that it should increasingly become conscious of its great mission as such. It is only those who are obsessed by the "no-Popery" war-cry who can fail to see what wonderful opportunities there may be in the unique position of this great Church. The forthcoming Lambeth Conference is therefore an event which is not only of interest to English Christians but to all those who are concerned with the unity of the Church of Christ.

V. 't H.

DIE ÜBERWINDUNG DES SÄKULARISMUS, von Martin Schlunk. *Furche-Verlag, Berlin, Germany.* Preis: RM. 1.

Few new words have such a curious history as the word "secularism". Coined at the Jerusalem Conference it has become the war-cry of the Christian forces in all corners of the earth. This shows that such a word was needed. All of us knew of the discrepancy between Christianity and Western civilization, but somehow it has become much more clear to us how deep the gulf is, how great the reality of secularism, since this word came to enlighten us.

We must however be careful just because it may help us in clearing our thoughts. We must guard against abuse or misunderstanding of it. We must try to attach a meaning to it which will be the same wherever it is used.

The paper of Professor Schlunk on the "overcoming of secularism" does not seem to help toward the explanation of its meaning. Professor Schlunk uses the word secularism to indicate the process of increasing knowledge and increasing mastery of nature and believes that secularism is only then to be rejected when it leads to a purely this-worldly conception of the world and of man.

He proceeds however to use it in the last sense exclusively, that is, as a rival and mortal enemy of Christianity and shows how we may overcome it. But why should we "overcome" secularism in itself if it really means both things? We have a very good word for the process of increasing discovery of the world, namely, science. And we have a good one for the mastery over nature, namely, technique. Let us therefore use the word secularism for the reality for which we have no other really helpful expression, namely, the one of the world-view without God.

This confusion is more dangerous than one would think. It influences the whole diagnosis of the situation. De we explain the modern secularism by pointing to the victories of science and tech-

nique? I do not think so. We can only explain secularism by pointing to ever deeper currents in our spiritual history such as the spirit of the Renaissance and of the Enlightenment. These are bound up with science but they are nevertheless distinct. Pascal was a great modern scientist but certainly no predecessor of secularism.

The positive remarks of Professor Schlunk are helpful. They emphasise the truths that were expressed in the Jerusalem message. We hope however that we may yet get from the pen of a man who is both a great scholar and an expert in the trends of modern life a really authoritative analysis of the history and meaning of secularism. A thorough diagnosis would make our struggle with it more effective.

V. t H.

EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE CHARAKTERKUNDE, von Fritz Künkel. Verlag: S. Hirzel, 3. Auflage 1930. *Englische Ausgabe: Let's be Normal: The Psychologist comes to his Senses.* Verlag: Washburn, New York. VITALE DIALEKTIK. S. Hirsfel. 1929.

Those who have read the article by Dr. Künkel in the present number of the *Student World* will want to know more about his thought. Some will want to find out whether these daring ideas about the future of psychology and of science generally, can really be defended on grounds of philosophy and of experience. Others will want to hear more about his views because they have a vague notion that this approach to psychology may solve many of their own burning problems. In the two works mentioned above they will find as much food for thought as they can possibly want for a long time to come. No, these revolutionary statements which Dr. Künkel makes in his article are not the product of rash speculation. They are based on the rich experience of a psycho-therapist and on the careful reflection of a scientific thinker. They are indeed defensible both on grounds of experience (Charakterkunde) and on grounds of philosophy. (Vitale Dialektik). Moreover they are indeed able to solve a great number of burning questions of life and thought with which all of us, however "normal" we may be, have to cope. The writer of this review does not pretend to be able to assess the significance of these books for the professional psychologists. But he would testify to their great value for ordinary human beings who have an interest in psychology. It is only after reading these books that one knows what was missing in the many other psychological works — from whatever side they came. This is so because Dr. Künkel has

an amazing gift of clear formulation and suggestive description and because he takes that life of the spirit which Christians consider the central theme of psychology — *n'en déplaie* à M. Freud and M. Watson — seriously.

We dislike the English title of "Charakterkunde" because it sounds too much like the headlines and because the slogan "Let's be normal" is not good enough for the profound intimations of Dr. Künkel. But we see the point of the second part of the title. Here the psychologist "comes really to his senses" in that he does not try to explain the human with inhuman categories but with notions derived from human reality.

It is surprising that Dr. Künkel comes again and again to the discovery that the central tenets of characterology and psychotherapy are identical with those of Christianity? Why should it be? Christianity does not speak of a truth which "might be" but of an actual, living truth. And this truth is present in all human reality. In the soul of man — of every man — the deep student of human life will find it — sometimes as a truth which is accepted, sometimes as one which is rejected — but always present as the truth about man's relation to God.

Professor Brunner has pointed out that we need a Christian psychology. He has taken care to add that it must be scientific in the true sense of that word. We believe that Dr. Künkel has shown us the way and that he has provided much of the material for such a psychology. He has not yet given it because he believes that the scientific standpoint necessitates a non-committal attitude to the transcendent influence in life. He states that science cannot do more than indicate the place where transcendence begins. But even so he had laid the basis for a psychology which will do full justice to man as a traveller "between two worlds".

V. 't H.

A CENTURY OF ANGLO-CATHOLICISM, by Professor H.L. Stewart.
Publishers: J.M. Dent and Sons, Aldine House, 10, 11, 12 and 13 Bedford Street, London, W.C.2. Price 10/6d. net.

This book belongs to a class of religious literature which is very rare and therefore very precious. It is a thorough, penetrating and exceedingly fair interpretation of one type of Christianity by a writer who owes allegiance to another section of the Christian church. It combines the information and insight of an insider with the objectivity and detachment of an outsider. Thus it is a real contribution to the understanding of and the discussion about Anglo-Catholicism.

The book gives both more and less than its title would lead us to expect. It is not a systematic study of the development of thought of the Anglo-Catholic movement. It is rather a study in relationships which describes the movement at three different stages of its development and dwells at length on the discussions which it aroused in England generally. How these stages were related to each other does not become quite clear because no attempt is made to arrive at a systematic conception of Anglo-Catholic theology. Is this the fault of the author? Or is it the very genius of Anglo-Catholicism? If one reads the chapters on the "Tracts", on "Lux Mundi" and on "Essays Catholic and Critical", the three outstanding Anglo-Catholic publications during the last century, one would be inclined to agree with the author that it is hard to fill in the gaps between these utterances, but one wonders nevertheless if Anglo-Catholics do not see more of a golden thread running through their history than he does.

On the other hand the book gives more than a simple discussion of Anglo-Catholicism. It is practically a survey of all the great religious discussions of the last century and is packed with suggestive remarks about our present day problems. It is never *only* historical. It dares to draw conclusions. Such sections as those on the power of conviction in Newman and on the hatred of compromise in later Anglo-Catholicism are sermons to our age, which we cannot afford to neglect. The last chapters on the Prayer-book and on the "Anglo-Catholic defiance of Parliament" which lead us right into the heart of the present situation are especially delicately handled. While the author does not withhold his own opinion he does full justice to all other viewpoints which have entered into the arena, and he succeeds in giving a more deeply psychological and more objective picture of the problem than any which we have seen. No cheap solution is offered. The hope of the author is however that the solution which must come will be an honest one, which allows for the full expression of the real genius of Anglo-Catholicism and all other vital forms of Christianity inside the one Church of England.

V. 't H.

FURCHE-ALMANACH AUF DAS JAHR 1930. *Mit einem beschreibenden Verzeichnis der Bücher des Furche-Verlags und des Furche-Kunstverlages, nebst biographischem Autorenregister und einer literarischen Beigabe: Auswahl aus den Predigten und Andachten von Claus Harms. Mit einem Bildnis Claus Harms.* 190 Seiten. In Kaschurband RM 1.80. Furche-Verlag G.m.b.H., Berlin NW 7.

Der neue Furche-Almanach will, wie seine Vorgänger, eine vollständige und sachliche Information über das Gesamtwerk des Furche-Verlages ermöglichen. Der literarische Teil des Almanachs bringt an Stelle der üblichen literarischen Kostproben eine in sich zusammenhängende Gabe von bleibender Bedeutung, nämlich die von Frideborg Ehlers veranstaltete Auswahl aus den Schriften und Predigten von Claus Harms, des ursprünglichen Dithmarschen, Schleiermacher's Zeitgenossen und Gegner.

CORRESPONDENCE

Does the "Student World" make you think? If so tell other readers what you are thinking. Tell them why you agree or disagree with the writers in this number. "The Student World" is already a medium of international discussion, but the groups of those who participate in these discussions should be much larger. All readers, students and student leaders, should use this section in which to discuss their convictions with others. By expressing your thoughts you are helping in the process of give and take which leads to deeper understanding of each other and in the discovery of that liberating message to students, which all in the Federation are seeking.

M. Robert de Traz, l'auteur de romans et d'essais hautement appréciés dont l'*Esprit de Genève*, paru récemment, a soulevé beaucoup d'intérêt, nous écrit :

"Le numéro du *Student World* que vous m'avez envoyé est d'une grande richesse. L'étude de Francis Miller m'a entièrement satisfait. Certes, le résumé qui le suit est excellent, mais tout de même j'ai regretté que n'y figurât pas cette phrase du texte original, parlant de l'homme qui a le sens œcuménique : "In a sense he is an alien to every nation, but every land is his fatherland". Cette question me préoccupe autant que le problème principal dont traite son article, et je la résumerai par ces mots contradictoires : « Comment devenir universel en restant particulier ? » Je crois que c'est là une des tâches de l'esprit moderne. Je crois aussi qu'il ne peut la résoudre qu'en fonction de Dieu. Autrement dit : les hommes sont tous différents, plus nous apprenons à les connaître, plus nous aboutissons à un éparpillement, à un relativisme, et nous ne retrouvons un absolu que dans le Créateur de toutes ces créatures.

Quant à votre article il m'a paru d'une clarté et d'une intelligence vraiment persuasives. J'aime beaucoup que vous disiez, tout simplement, que le christianisme ne dépend pas de notre volonté mais existe par lui-même ; et aussi le passage où vous dites que, même si nous ne croyons plus, par moments, la Vérité existe quand même, et même si nous lui désobéissons, et même si nous la concevons mal.

L'étude du professeur de Zwaan est pleine d'idées. Tout le reste du numéro est, d'ailleurs, plein d'intérêt. »

Mr. Osmo Tiilila, General Secretary of the Student Christian Movement of Finland, writes :

"*The Student World* has been to me personally very useful in my effort to become acquainted with the thinking of the Federation on various international questions, and I think that many of our members have undergone the same experience. I am very glad to hear that you have taken over the editorship of the magazine — your first number is excellent ! It is surely of great importance that *The Student World* should be devoted to the discussion of the central question of the Federation's message. It can give a good contribution to the Federation by clearing up its message from the now prevailing confusion. That is, I think, a task of world-wide significance in the coming years. "

Rev. Ralla Ram, General Secretary of the Student Christian Association of India, Burma and Ceylon writes :

" I was reading last night the October number of the "*Student World* ", and I write to congratulate you on this issue. I am so very grateful to you for taking a stand against a " sentimental amiability " which is out seeking the " irreducible minimum " in all religions to produce a sort of pleasing syncretism. This issue of the "*Student World* " is most timely and in all our religious thinking, we must include what Christ would include and we must exclude what Christ would exclude '.

I shall call attention to some of the articles in our next number and in January would review the articles at length. "

Miss Xenia Braikevitch of the British and Russian Student Christian Movements writes :

" I liked the last October number very much indeed. It raises vital questions which we must all answer for ourselves. If we were surer of our faith the W.S.C.F. would be a strong Christian International fighting for Christ against the antichristian forces of the world. The whole issue makes you think hard about things and helps one. "

Notes on Contributors

PROFESSOR D. EMIL BRUNNER is Professor of the Theological Faculty at the University of Zürich and the author of "Die Mystik und das Wort", "Religionsphilosophie protestantischer Theologie", "Der Mittler", and "The Theology of Crisis."

MR. H.S. ELLIOTT is Director of the Department of Religious Education and Psychology at Union Theological Seminary, New York, and the author of "The Bearing of Psychology upon Religion" and "The Process of Group Thinking".

H.D. HILL is a Ph.D. of the University of Chicago, a contributor to "The Atlantic", "The Saturday Review of Literature" and "The Nation", and one of the associates publishing "American Labor Dynamics". She is in private life Mrs. Francis P. Miller.

DR. PH. KOHNSTAMM is a professor at the Pedagogical Seminary, Amsterdam. He was formerly Professor of Physics at the University of Amsterdam. He is the author of many books on physics, on philosophy and on pedagogy and has recently published his findings on the psychology and education of youth in a Dutch volume "Growing Personality".

DR. FRITZ KÜNKEL is a psycho-therapist in Berlin and the author of "Charakterkunde" (English: Let's be Normal), "Arbeit am Charakter" and "Vitale Dialektik".

PROFESSOR ARVID RUNESTAMM is Professor of the Theological Faculty at the University of Upsala, Sweden and the author of various books on theological and ethical subjects.

MR. Z.F. WILLIS M.A. is educational secretary of the National Council of Y.M.C.A.'s of England and has just been called to the World's Committee of Y.M.C.A.'s as secretary for leadership training.